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LEAD ARTICLE
THE REASONABLE BLACK CHILD:
RACE, ADOLESCENCE,
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
KRISTIN HENNING*
Police contact with black youth is ubiquitous. Under the guise of reasonable
articulable suspicion, police stop black youth on the vaguest of lookout
descriptions—“black boys running,” “two black males in jeans, one in a gray
hoodie,” “black male in athletic gear,” and “black male with a bicycle.” Young
black males are treated as if they are “out of place” not only when they are in
white, middle-class neighborhoods, but also when they are hanging out in public
spaces or sitting on their own porches.
In this Article, Professor Henning seeks to reduce racial disparities in the
juvenile and criminal justice systems by urging courts to modify the reasonable
person standard that undergirds much of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Drawing upon recent advances in cognitive science and developmental research,
this Article attempts to bring the search and seizure doctrine into line with what
we now know about normal adolescent development, implicit racial bias, and
contemporary relationships between black youth and the police. This Article
explores four contexts in which the unique interplay between race and adolescence
should alter current Fourth Amendment analysis—seizure, the consent-to-search
doctrine, the officer’s recitation of facts to support reasonable articulable suspicion
for a stop, and the court’s assignment of meaning to those facts.
Historically, courts have gauged the reasonableness of an officer’s on-the-street

* Agnes N. Williams Research Professor of Law and Director, Juvenile Justice
Clinic, Georgetown Law. I am grateful to Brittany Harwell and Jenadee Nanini for their
excellent research assistance. I am also grateful to the many colleagues who reviewed
earlier drafts of this Article in the Mid-Atlantic Criminal Law Research Collective and
the faculty research workshop at the George Washington University Law School.
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encounter with a youth against the same “reasonable person” standard applied to
adults. However, in 2011, the Supreme Court announced a major shift in criminal
justice jurisprudence when it held in J.D.B. v. North Carolina that the test for
determining whether a child was in “custody” for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona
must be evaluated through the lens of a “reasonable juvenile” rather than a
reasonable adult. Since then, several scholars have called for the extension of the
reasonable child standard to other aspects of criminal law and procedure, including
the Fourth Amendment. These shifts provide a critically important advance in
criminal procedure, but may not go far enough to protect the rights of black youth
who are disproportionately overrepresented in the juvenile justice system.
To ensure adequate Fourth Amendment protection for black youth, Professor
Henning argues that police and courts should be honest about how race and age
affect every critical decision in the Fourth Amendment inquiry. To this end, it is
incumbent upon police officers to better understand the nature of adolescent
development and implicit racial bias and to develop more appropriate strategies
for engaging black youth. It is equally incumbent upon reviewing courts to reject
outdated assumptions about the meaning of “suspect” behavior—including flight
from the police—and to rethink the limits of the reasonable person standard
throughout the Fourth Amendment doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Andre, a fifteen-year-old black male was walking down the
street with a friend, James, of the same age. There was no report of
crime, and the boys were not engaged in any suspicious activity. Yet
the police drove up next to them and asked them if they had heard
any gunshots. When the boys said “no” and kept walking, the police
asked them to “show me your waist.” Both boys complied. Still
unsatisfied, the police asked the boys for permission to search them,
at which point either Andre or his friend said “yes.” Four uniformed
officers exited their marked police car, forced the boys against the
wall, and frisked them. The police found a gun on Andre.1

Under the most common reading of the Fourth Amendment, the
police conduct was lawful. A reviewing court would likely view the
officer’s initial request as a mere contact and the search as consensual.
1. Although “Andre” is a pseudonym, the factual scenario is real and was drawn
from the police report of one of the many youths the author has represented in the
last twenty-three years as a juvenile defense attorney and clinical law professor in
Washington, DC.
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But is this a fair and accurate interpretation of the interaction between
Andre and the police? Would a reasonable black child in Andre’s
position really have felt free to ignore the officers or deny their request?
Was the consent to search truly voluntary?
Now imagine that Andre had refused to cooperate. Imagine that
Andre and James refused to look at the officers when they appeared in
the block—or that they ran when the officers approached in a marked
police car. The officers would likely characterize Andre’s conduct as
nervousness, furtive movement, or flight indicative of consciousness of
guilt and sufficient to provide reasonable articulable suspicion to justify
a stop. But would that be a fair evaluation of Andre’s behavior? Would
his refusal to cooperate—or even his flight—be fairly interpreted as
consciousness of guilt?
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals like Andre from
unreasonable searches and seizures.2 Anytime the police restrain
Andre’s liberty in any significant way, they must justify that restraint with
evidence of Andre’s consent or with facts sufficient to demonstrate
reasonable articulable suspicion to believe Andre was engaged in some
kind of criminal conduct.3 On review, the legality of the officers’
interaction with Andre will be evaluated on a standard of
reasonableness,4 but the vantage point of reasonableness will fluctuate
depending on the question posed. Reviewing courts will evaluate the
seizure and consent-to-search inquiries from the lens of the person
being seized and searched.5 Thus, a court will decide whether Andre
has been seized by asking whether a reasonable person in Andre’s
position would have felt free to leave.6 A court will assess the validity of
Andre’s consent by asking whether a reasonable person in Andre’s
circumstance would have felt free to give or decline consent.7 By
contrast, courts will evaluate justifications for police intrusion from the
lens of a reasonable police officer.8 That is, a court will ask whether the

2. U.S. CONST. amend IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
3. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
4. See id. at 27–28 (explaining that the officer’s search and seizure of the
defendant must be reviewed for its reasonableness).
5. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
6. Id. (establishing the “free to leave” test).
7. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248–49 (1973) (holding that the test
for reviewing whether a defendant’s consent was voluntary is a totality of the circumstances
test, which includes an analysis of the defendant’s personal characteristics).
8. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
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officers in the scenario above had reasonable articulable suspicion to
believe Andre and his friend were engaged in some criminal activity.9
The reasonableness of the officers’ assessment will turn on the totality
of the officers’ observations as well as the commonsense judgments the
officers make about the meaning of those observations.10
Historically, courts have gauged the reasonableness of a child’s
conduct and perceptions in the Fourth Amendment framework against
the same “reasonable person” standard applied to adults.11 Thus, in the
synopsis above, courts would presume that Andre had the same freedom
and capacity as an adult to ignore the police and walk away. Andre’s
flight and furtive gestures would also tend to convey an adult-like
consciousness of guilt, or otherwise suggest that he had something to
hide.12 Recently, courts have begun to retreat from presumptions like
these as they consider the commonsense conclusions that should be
drawn about how youth think and behave.13
In 2011, the Supreme Court announced a major shift in criminal
justice jurisprudence when it held in J.D.B. v. North Carolina14 that the
test for determining whether a child was in “custody”—and no longer
free to terminate a police interrogation—for purposes of Miranda v.
Arizona,15 must be evaluated through the lens of a “reasonable child”
rather than a reasonable adult.16 Since then, several scholars have
called for the extension of the reasonable child standard to other
aspects of criminal law and procedure, including the courts’ evaluation
of a minor’s mens rea and criminal responsibility, affirmative defenses,
9. See id. (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able
to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”).
10. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
11. Marsha L. Levick & Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, The United States Supreme Court Adopts
a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B. v. North Carolina for the Purposes of the Miranda
Custody Analysis: Can a More Reasoned Justice System for Juveniles Be Far Behind?, 47 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 501, 503 (2012) (citing In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 140 (N.C. 2009)).
12. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (reasoning that flight suggests guilt).
13. See Hoffman v. Saginaw Pub. Schs., No. 12–10354, 2012 WL 2450805, at *6
(E.D. Mich. June 27, 2012) (determining that youth is a relevant factor in a Miranda
custody analysis) (quoting J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011)); see also
Smith v. Clark, No. 2:11-cv-3312, 2013 WL 4409717, at *9–11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013)
(acknowledging that age is now a relevant factor in a Miranda custody analysis, but not
faulting the state court for not applying it as a factor before federal law was clear on
the matter), aff’d, 612 F. App’x 418 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1464 (2016).
14. 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
15. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272.
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waiver of the right to counsel, Terry stops, and consent to search among
other critical Fourth Amendment questions.17 These shifts provide a
critically important advance in criminal procedure but may not go far
enough to protect the rights of black youth who are disproportionately
overrepresented in the juvenile justice system.
This Article urges courts to go further and consider the commonsense
judgments and inferences that flow readily from the unique interplay
between race and adolescence in a typical police-youth encounter.
Specifically, this Article explores four contexts in which race and
adolescence affect the Fourth Amendment analysis: (1) seizure; (2) the
consent to search doctrine; (3) an officer’s observation of facts that provide
reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a stop; and (4) the assignment of
meaning to those facts. To what extent does the child’s race affect the
objective assessment of whether a police-youth encounter ventures from a
“contact” to a seizure? To what extent does the child’s race affect the
voluntariness of consent? To what extent should the child’s race affect the
officers’ interpretation of a child’s behavior in the reasonable articulable
suspicion or probable cause analysis? In the encounter described above,
few, if any, black boys in Andre’s circumstances would have felt free to
ignore the officer’s intrusion.18 Andre’s age and race would necessarily
affect the reasonableness of his perception about whether he was free to
17. See, e.g., Megan Annitto, Consent Searches of Minors, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 1, 6 (2014) (calling for courts to “meaningfully consider age when deciding
whether a minor gave consent”); Hilary B. Farber, J.D.B. v. North Carolina: Ushering
in a New “Age” of Custody Analysis Under Miranda, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 117, 120 (2011)
(discussing the impact of recent juvenile rights cases with respect to Terry stops, waiver
of the right to counsel, and the attorney-client relationship); Lily N. Katz, Tailoring
Entrapment to the Adolescent Mind, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 94, 100 (2014)
(arguing that for cases involving minors, entrapment should be evaluated from the
perspective of an ordinary, law-abiding youth); Levick & Tierney, supra note 11, at 504
(asserting that the reasonable juvenile standard should be extended to other areas of
criminal law); Shobha L. Mahadev, Youth Matters: Roper, Graham, J.D.B., Miller, and
the New Juvenile Jurisprudence, CHAMPION, Mar. 2014, at 14, 14 (advising defense
attorneys to raise youth-centered arguments for juveniles in light of the Supreme
Court’s recent transformational decisions regarding youth and criminal procedure).
But see Jonathan S. Carter, You’re Only as “Free to Leave” as You Feel: Police Encounters with
Juveniles and the Trouble with Differential Standards for Investigatory Stops Under In re I.R.T.,
88 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1391–92 (2010) (arguing that courts should not consider age in
the seizure inquiry).
18. See Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1150–52 (2012) (arguing that race can
influence one’s perception of the world, and that “[a] young black male who has grown
up in South Central Los Angeles knows that if he is stopped by a police officer, he should
do whatever the officer says and not talk back unless he wants to kiss the ground”).
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leave and disregard the police contact.
Several scholars have advocated for a reasonable African American
standard in the Fourth Amendment context.19 This Article advances that
discourse by urging law enforcement officers and reviewing courts to
consider the intersection of race and adolescence in the search and
seizure analysis and incorporate the Supreme Court’s evolving
jurisprudence regarding a reasonable child standard into the Fourth
Amendment framework. Part I of this Article surveys the Court’s recent
articulation of a reasonable child standard in criminal law and procedure
and then advocates for an extension of that standard to the Fourth
Amendment seizure analysis and consent-to-search doctrine. Recognizing
that even a reasonable child standard may be inadequate to protect black
youth from unreasonable police intrusions, Part I also considers the impact
of race on the child’s perception of his freedom to leave and the
voluntariness of his consent. Part II draws upon race and adolescence to
examine the adequacy of the reasonable articulable suspicion standard as
a safeguard against arbitrary and unnecessary stops and frisks. This Part
also explores the impact of implicit racial bias on police interpretations of
innocuous and ambiguous behaviors as violent or aggressive and urges
courts to abandon long-held, but inaccurate “commonsense judgments”
about the meaning of behaviors such as flight and furtive gestures among
adolescents, especially black adolescents, in contemporary police-youth
encounters. Part III identifies likely objections to the consideration of
race and age in the Fourth Amendment analysis and responds to them in
turn. Part III concludes with suggestions for police reform, such as
training on adolescent development, organizational commitment to
developmentally appropriate policing, and less police involvement in
school discipline.
I.

THE REASONABLE PERSON IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

Reasonableness undergirds every aspect of the search and seizure
inquiry. In the plain language of the Fourth Amendment, the people
have the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

19. See, e.g., Randall S. Susskind, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure,
31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327, 349 (1994) (arguing that courts should scrutinize racial
factors when determining whether there was reasonable suspicion); Mia Carpiniello,
Note, Striking a Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person Standard for “Location Plus
Evasion” Terry Stops, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 355, 356 (2001) (expanding Susskind’s
proposal to include flight in high-crime areas).
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effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”20 Reasonableness
in the Fourth Amendment context is largely—though not entirely—
measured by an objective reasonable person standard.21 The reasonable
person standard has long been a prominent feature of the American
common law,22 providing a normative, objective measure by which we
can determine the contours of negligence, recklessness, and liability in
civil law and blameworthiness, excuse, and mitigation in criminal law.23
It also allows us to regulate police conduct by identifying common
perceptions and expectations in police-citizen encounters, such as
searches, seizures, and interrogations.24
The reasonable person has been defined in criminal law as one who
“possesses the intelligence, educational background, level of prudence, and
temperament of an average person.”25 In tort law, the reasonable person has
been defined as “a person exercising those qualities of attention, knowledge,
intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its members for the
protection of their own interests and the interests of others.”26 Originally
labeled the “reasonable man,”27 the objective reasonable person standard
reflects the norms of dominant groups in society.28 The reasonable person

20. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
21. See Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
71, 83 (2007) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s reliance on objective and subjective
standards in various Fourth Amendment doctrines).
22. Levick & Tierney, supra note 11, at 504 n.15 (noting that “[t]he reasonable person
standard emerged in the common law during the first half of the nineteenth-century,” and
“[t]he concept appeared for the first time in both tort and the criminal law in the same
year” (citing R. v. Kirkham (1837) 173 Eng. Rep. 422, 424 (stating that “the law . . . requires
that [man] should exercise a reasonable control over his passions”))).
23. Id. at 501–06 (summarizing the use of the reasonable person standard in
American law).
24. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271 (2011) (explaining that a
suspect is in custody if a reasonable person would have believed himself to be under
formal arrest or retrained in her freedom of movement to the degree associated with
formal arrest); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004) (holding that a suspect
is in custody for purposes of Miranda if, under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonable person would not feel free to end the encounter and leave); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“[A] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”).
25. Levick & Tierney, supra note 11, at 505 (quoting JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.04 [B][3][b] (1987)).
26. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. B (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
27. Kinports, supra note 21, at 73.
28. Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813, 818–
19 (1992) (observing that these dominant groups historically included “male dates”).
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is a fictitious character,29 likely an adult white male—if for no other reason
than he has been penned over time by judges and lawmakers who are
predominately white and male.30
A. Race, Adolescence, and Seizure
In analyzing the legality of an officer’s on-the-street encounter with a
civilian, courts will first call upon the reasonable man in deciding whether
the Fourth Amendment has even been implicated—that is, whether a
person has been seized.31 As the Supreme Court articulated in United
States v. Mendenhall32: “[A] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave.”33 Not every police-citizen encounter involves a
seizure. A casual encounter escalates into a seizure only when an officer
“by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen.”34 In determining whether there has
been a show of authority sufficient to indicate a stop, the courts may
consider the officer’s tone of voice, the time of day, the location of the
encounter, the number of police officers present, any physical contact
with the suspect, and the officer’s display of weapons.35 Police officers
may identify themselves as an officer and engage with an individual on
the street as long as they do not convey that compliance is required.36
29. Levick & Tierney, supra note 11, at 504–05.
30. See Lee, supra note 18, at 1150 (2012) (noting that “a reasonableness standard
can mask the fact that what the law considers reasonable is often just what those in
positions of authority consider to be reasonable”); see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial
Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
405, 407 n.3 (2000) (finding that, as of 2000, “African Americans comprise only 3.3%
of the judges on our nation’s federal, state, and local courts” and “[o]ver 90% of all
federal appellate judges are white”); Nia Malika-Henderson, White Men Are 31 Percent
of the American Population. They Hold 65 Percent of All Elected Offices, WASH. POST (Oct. 8,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/10/08/65-percentof-all-american-elected-officials-are-white-men.
31. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
32. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
33. Id. at 554.
34. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
35. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554–55.
36. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1991); see also Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (“[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public
place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to
him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal
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A police-citizen encounter that is consensual—and not required by
the police—does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.37 These
consensual encounters or “contacts” do not require warrants, probable
cause, or reasonable articulable suspicion.38 The seminal question is
whether the person knew he was free to leave when he agreed to
engage with the officer.39
Let us turn again to Andre, and consider whether a reasonable
person in Andre’s position would have believed he was free to leave
when approached by four uniformed officers in a marked police car. The
Supreme Court assumes that any person approached by the police “need
not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to
the questions at all and may go on his way.”40 If the Court is right, a
reasonable adult might rationally conclude that the disadvantages of
engaging with the officers (e.g., the risk of arrest) outweigh any
advantages of that engagement (e.g., a false belief that “acting innocent”
and being cooperative will dispel the officers’ suspicion). An adult who
values his privacy and resents the officers’ intrusion might also refuse to
engage as a way of preserving his own dignity; and an adult with some
familiarity with the law might understand that the officers have no
authority to command his compliance and that indeed, he is free to go
about his business.41 Although this is a comforting allusion for the
Court, it has little support in psychology. As many commentators have
noted, in reality very few people—adult or child—feel free to walk away
from an officer’s questions without consequences.42 Research finding
prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.”).
37. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.
38. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 8.1 (4th ed. 2004).
39. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
40. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498.
41. Cf. James A. Adams, Search and Seizure as Seen by Supreme Court Justices: Are They
Serious or Is This Just Judicial Humor?, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413, 441 (1993)
(explaining that people who know their rights and would otherwise exercise them are in
a “Catch 22” because not complying “may cause police to escalate the intrusiveness of
the encounter and place the citizen at risk of both physical harm and formal arrest”).
42. See John M. Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1109, 1114 (2007)
(exploring cases and studies in depth and questioning whether citizens really ever give
voluntary consent given the psychological and social pressures that accompany a
police-citizen encounter); Matthew Phillips, Effective Warnings Before Consent Searches:
Practical, Necessary, and Desirable, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1185, 1207–08 (2008) (discussing
psychological studies that suggest that the inherently coercive nature of a police-citizen
encounter pressures the majority of adult citizens to acquiesce to demands by police);
see also Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for
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that people tend to “interpret questions or suggestions as orders when
they come from a person of authority” confirms that many people feel
compelled to cooperate with police.43
This compulsion to comply is exacerbated for youth like Andre.
Youth are not only socialized to comply with adult authority figures, such
as parents, teachers, and police,44 but they also have less experience to
draw upon than adults, especially in the legal arena.45 Today, much of a
youth’s knowledge of the police comes from television, internet, and
social media, which provide them with little reason to believe they can
decline to engage with an officer who approaches them.46 Even when
young people know their rights, research demonstrates that
adolescents are especially vulnerable to coercive circumstances and
“may respond adversely to external pressures that adults are able to
resist.”47 Clinical psychologist Thomas Grisso and colleagues studied
adolescents’ abilities to make decisions in the law enforcement and
juvenile justice contexts by asking adolescents and young adults how
they would respond to various scenarios, including police
interrogation, attorney consultation, and plea agreement discussions.48
Grisso’s study revealed that adolescents aged fifteen years and younger
were more likely than older adolescents and young adults to make
Understanding the Consent Search Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 800–17 (2005) (examining
psychological studies on obedience to authority and obedience to uniformed officials,
studies which demonstrate the compelling effect of the social authority most people
associate with law enforcement).
43. Josephine Ross, Can Social Science Defeat a Legal Fiction? Challenging Unlawful
Stops Under the Fourth Amendment, 18 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 315, 332 (2012).
44. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent
Development and Police Interrogation, 31 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 53, 62 (2007) (citing Thomas
Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’
Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 357 (2003) [hereinafter
Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial]) (explaining that the choices of juveniles seem to
reflect their tendency to heed authority figures).
45. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty,
58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1011 (2003) (stating that youths’ cognitive levels can
impact their choices, and that their cognitive abilities greatly improve through life
experience and education).
46. See, e.g., Christina Dacchille & Lisa Thurau, Improving Police-Youth Interactions,
ABA (Apr. 2, 2013), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/
content/articles/spring2013-0413-improving-police-youth-interactions.html (noting that
youth learn incorrect information from television and therefore are confused in
interactions with police).
47. Steinberg & Scott, supra note 45, at 1014.
48. Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 44, at 340.
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decisions that were compliant with adult authority figures.49 These
findings are instructive as courts evaluate the reasonableness of a youth’s
perception about whether he was free to leave.
1.

The reasonable child in criminal law and procedure
In common law, the “reasonable person” initially failed to account
for the unique attributes of youth.50 Although courts have recognized
the difference between children and adults in tort law for some time,51
criminal law has lagged behind other legal doctrines in acknowledging
that children and youth need some special legal protections.52
Historically, criminal courts measured the reasonableness of police
conduct and the reasonableness of a youth’s response to police
presence against the same reasonable person standard applied to
adults.53 Only recently have courts been willing to acknowledge
differences in our commonsense understanding of what a child would
do and what an adult would do in similar circumstances in the criminal
context.54 In 2005 and 2010, respectively, the Court articulated the
earliest recognition of differences between youth and adults in
measuring criminal responsibility when it abolished the juvenile death
penalty under the Eighth Amendment in Roper v. Simmons 55 and held
that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for youth
49. Id. at 353.
50. Levick & Tierney, supra note 11, at 502, 508 (describing some of the unique
attributes of youth as immaturity, susceptibility to peer pressure, and personality traits
still in development).
51. Id. at 502; see J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 10 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2005)). Negligence
doctrine only holds children to a standard of care described as “that of a reasonable
person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.” See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (grounding
this relaxed standard in the notion that a child is defined as “a person of such
immature years as to be incapable of exercising the judgment, intelligence,
knowledge, experience, and prudence demanded by the standard of the reasonable
man applicable to adults”).
52. Levick & Tierney, supra note 11, at 506 (discussing the different trajectory of
reasonableness for children and adults in other areas of common law).
53. Id. at 503.
54. Id. at 502–03, 507–08; see J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 281 (holding that a child’s age must
be considered in determining whether a person is in custody in the Miranda analysis);
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that a sentence of life without
parole for juveniles convicted of a non-homicide violates the Eighth Amendment);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (abolishing juvenile death penalty under
the Eighth Amendment).
55. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

2018]

THE REASONABLE BLACK CHILD

1525

convicted of a non-homicide offense violated the Eighth Amendment
in Graham v. Florida.56 However, it was not until 2011 that the Court
first articulated an explicit “reasonable child” standard.57
a. The first reasonable child in criminal law: custodial interrogation
Criminal law experienced a major shift in 2011 when the Supreme
Court held in J.D.B. v. North Carolina that the test for determining
whether a child was “in custody” for Miranda purposes—and thus would
not have felt free to terminate a police interrogation—must be evaluated
through the lens of a “reasonable child” rather than a reasonable adult.58
In J.D.B., a thirteen-year-old, middle-school student was removed from
his classroom and interrogated in a closed conference room about a
series of burglaries in his neighborhood by a police investigator, a
uniformed school resource officer, the assistant principal, and an
administrative intern.59 The officers did not read J.D.B. his Miranda
rights, provide him with an opportunity to consult with his
grandmother, or tell him he was free to leave the room.60
In the majority opinion, Justice Sotomayor treated youth as an
“unambiguous fact” that “generates commonsense conclusions about
behavior and perception,”61 and noted that throughout American
history “a person’s childhood is a relevant circumstance” in
ascertaining what the so-called reasonable person would have done in
the particular circumstances at issue.62 Society has long recognized
that children lack the intelligence, knowledge, experience, judgment,
and prudence embodied by a reasonable man. Restrictions on a
child’s right to obtain a driver’s license, get married, enter into a
contract, join the military, vote, make medical decisions, view
pornography, drink alcohol, or drop out of school reflect our
understanding that children lack the judgment and experience
needed to make these types of decisions or engage in these types of
activities.63 Recently, developmental research has confirmed what

56. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
57. Levick & Tierney, supra note 11, at 517.
58. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 271–72.
59. Id. at 265–66.
60. Id. at 266.
61. Levick & Tierney, supra note 11, at 511 (quoting J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272).
62. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 274 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 10 cmt. b.
(AM. LAW INST. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE
65–67 (2008).
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society has long known—that children are not as mature as adults.64 In
Roper, the Court relied on developmental science to make the
following conclusions: (1) youth are immature and fail to demonstrate
mature judgment; (2) youth are more susceptible to peer pressure,
especially negative pressure; and (3) youth do not have fixed
characters and thus have a greater capacity to change than adults.65
The Court went on to note that common features of adolescence often
lead youth to engage in impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions, and that youth have less control, or less experiences with
control over their own environment.66
The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed concerns that
adolescents are more easily intimidated and vulnerable to police pressure
than adults in the interrogation context.67 In 1948, the Court in Haley v.
Ohio 68 noted that police conduct “which would leave a man cold and
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.”69 In
1962, the Court in Gallegos v. Colorado70 excluded a fourteen-year-old’s
confession because he was too immature to understand and assert his
constitutional rights.71 In 1967, the Court in In re Gault 72 cautioned that
great care must be taken to ensure that an adolescent’s confession “was
not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright[,]
or despair.”73 Finally, in J.D.B., the Court noted that “[b]y its very nature,
custodial police interrogation entails ‘inherently compelling
procedures,’” which become “all the more acute” when a child is the
subject of the interrogation.74 As the Court observed, a “reasonable child
64. Steinberg & Scott, supra note 45, at 1011.
65. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (drawing from studies relied
upon by in amici curiae briefs from the American Medical Association and the
American Psychological Association); Levick & Tierney, supra note 11, at 508.
66. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citations omitted).
67. Scott-Hayward, supra note 44, at 63; see J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272 (“Addressing the
specific context of police interrogation, we have observed that events that ‘would leave
a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.’”
(quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion)); Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (“[A] 14-year old boy, no matter how sophisticated,
is unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible
only to the police.”).
68. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
69. Id. at 599.
70. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
71. Id. at 54.
72. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
73. Id. at 55.
74. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269 (2011) (quoting Miranda v.
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subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit
when a reasonable adult would feel free to go.”75 Drawing upon
commonsense judgments confirmed by research, prior case law regarding
the link between youth status and legal status, and the observations of any
parent, Justice Sotomayor provided the first explicit articulation of a
“reasonable child” doctrine in criminal law.76 Under this new standard, a
child’s age would affect how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position
would perceive his or her freedom to leave.77
Prior to J.D.B., the Court had been unwilling to formally consider
age in the custody analysis because of the need to give clear guidance
to police and to avoid creating a subjective inquiry with the
consideration of age.78 Justice Sotomayor bypassed that objection in
2011 by concluding that courts can take age into account without
dismantling the objective nature of the Miranda analysis: Because the
differences between children and adults are “self-evident to anyone
who was a child once himself, including any police officer or judge,”
then “[w]e think it clear that courts can account for that reality without
doing any damage to the objective nature of the custody analysis.”79 As
long as the officer knew the child’s age or objectively should have
known the child’s age, its addition as a factor comports with the
objective character of the custody analysis.80
b. Extending the reasonable child standard to the Fourth Amendment
Just as a child’s age affects the determination of whether a child is in
custody for purposes of Miranda, it must also affect the determination
of whether a child has been seized in the Fourth Amendment
context.81 The seizure analysis, which requires courts to determine
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
75. Id. at 272.
76. See Levick & Tierney, supra note 11, at 517; see also J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272–74.
77. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 275.
78. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004) (declining to consider
the youth’s age in the custody analysis).
79. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272.
80. Id. at 277.
81. See Annitto, supra note 17, at 36 (contending that reasonable child analysis
should apply in the consent search context); Farber, supra note 17, at 121 (contending
that the reasonableness of a whether a child would feel free to terminate an encounter
with the police will be affected when age is considered); Levick & Tierney, supra
note 11, at 504, 517 (contending that courts’ articulation of reasonable juvenile
standard of J.D.B. should have application in several other areas of the criminal law
beyond the Fifth Amendment).
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whether a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, would
have felt free to walk away or ignore the police,82 is virtually identical to
the custody analysis. Both ask courts to evaluate the reasonableness of
subjectively held beliefs.83 Now that the Court has acknowledged the
importance of considering immaturity when applying constitutional
protections to youth, “absent compelling justification to the contrary[,] a
child’s age has ‘an objectively discernible relationship’ to determinations
of reasonableness throughout the common law.”84 The same concerns
about adolescents’ limited decision making capacity and susceptibility to
outside influences are relevant to various aspects of the Fourth
Amendment framework. As Justice Sotomayor concluded in J.D.B., “To
hold . . . that a child’s age is never relevant to whether a suspect has been
taken into custody—and thus to ignore the very real differences between
children and adults—would be to deny children the full scope of the
procedural safeguards” that the Constitution guarantees to adults.85
Since J.D.B., several state courts have incorporated the reasonable
child standard into their Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In
Delaware, for example, the state supreme court explicitly recognized
that a child’s age is a factor to be considered in evaluating the
reasonableness of a seizure when it held that an eight-year-old had
been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the child was
escorted to the Vice Principal’s office by a teacher’s aide, held for close
to an hour by a uniformed officer carrying a gun, handcuffs, and other
indicia of police authority, and was not advised that he could leave.86
Courts in California have cited J.D.B. extensively in dicta when
discussing whether J.D.B.’s holding that a child’s age is a factor in the
reasonable person standard for custody should implicate other areas
of criminal procedure, including voluntariness of waivers of rights and
seizure inquiries.87 Even before J.D.B., courts in Florida, North
82. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988); see also United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
83. Levick & Tierney, supra note 11, at 520.
84. Id. at 517 (quoting J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 275).
85. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 281.
86. Hunt ex rel. DeSombre v. State, 69 A.3d 360, 366 (Del. 2013).
87. See, e.g., In re J.G., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (finding it
unnecessary to decide whether age should be considered in the reasonable-person
analysis for custody because the current juvenile appellant “would not have felt free to
go regardless of his or her age”); In re Michael S., No. B229809, 2012 WL 3091576, at
*4 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2012) (discussing J.D.B. in dicta to state “that a child’s age
‘would have affected how a reasonable person’ in appellant’s position ‘would perceive
[his] freedom to leave’” (alteration in original) (quoting J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 271–72)).
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Carolina, and Illinois had already adopted a reasonable child standard
in the Fourth Amendment seizure analysis.88
To date, the Court has not specifically addressed the role of age in
determining whether a child was seized under the Fourth Amendment.
However, Wayne R. LaFave’s leading treatise on search and seizure law
has predicted that if the Supreme Court were to resolve the question of
whether age is relevant to the seizure inquiry, “it is likely a majority of
the Court would conclude that this ‘reasonable person’ test requires
consideration of some known unique characteristics of the suspect (e.g.,
his youth). Indeed such a result seems highly likely given the Court’s
resolution of an analogous issue in J.D.B. v. North Carolina.”89
2. The reasonable black child
Despite its profound impact on criminal law and procedure, the
reasonable child standard may not be sufficient to protect a childlike
Andre if it fails to account for race. Implicit in the reasonable person
standard is an assumption that all groups have similar historical and
contemporary relationships with law enforcement.90 Critical race
theorists and feminist scholars have long challenged the reasonable
person standard as a masquerade for the reasonableness of what the
people in authority (white, male, and wealthy) believe to be
reasonable.91 Thus, a court’s reliance on a reasonable person standard
runs the risk of reinforcing the prevailing biases and racial stereotypes
in the criminal justice system.92 Critics complain that the standard
“ignores the real world” and promotes “social inequities.”93 To account
for distinctive experiences across race, some have advocated for a more
subjective standard of reasonableness.94 Others contend that the
Court’s failure to account for race undermines the original intent of the
Fourth Amendment drafted by framers who specifically intended to
protect disfavored minorities from the government’s selective use of

88. See, e.g., F.E.H. v. State, 28 So. 3d 213, 216–17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); J.N. v.
State, 778 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Lopez, 892 N.E.2d 1047,
1064–65 (Ill. 2008); In re I.R.T., 647 S.E.2d 129, 134 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
89. LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 9.4(a).
90. See Susskind, supra note 19, at 345–46 (arguing that courts apply the wrong
standard in evaluating police conduct to determine whether a minority suspect has
been seized); see also Lee, supra note 30, at 1150–51.
91. See Lee, supra note 30, at 1150.
92. Id. at 1156–57.
93. Kinports, supra note 21, at 73.
94. See id.
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search and seizure powers.95
Experience suggests that a child’s race would have as much impact
on a child’s perception of whether he was free to leave as would his
age. Throughout American history, blacks have had a tenuous
relationship with police. In every critical era—slavery, Jim Crow,
lynching, and the contemporary era of mass incarceration—blacks have
perceived police to be proponents of discrimination and subordination
through violence and intimidation.96 Today, it is difficult to imagine any
black person who is immune from the persistent national coverage of
police-on-black killings. To account for these distinct experiences of
black Americans with the police, at least two scholars have advocated for
a reasonable African American standard in the Fourth Amendment
construct.97 Professor Randall Susskind has proposed that courts
determine seizure through a reasonable person standard that asks
whether a reasonable African American would have felt free to ignore
the police.98 Mia Carpiniello extended Susskind’s proposal by seeking
to apply a reasonable black person standard to the evaluation of
suspicion in “location plus evasion” police stops.99
This Article contends that a black child’s experience is unique. That
is, a black child’s perception of the police arises not only from his
blackness, but also from his youth. Courts will find important insights
for the Fourth Amendment analysis at this intersection of race and
adolescence. While there is no body of empirical research on normative
trends in how black Americans interact with law enforcement, there is a
wealth of anecdotal and qualitative literature on how blacks—and black
youth in particular—perceive and respond to the police. Black youths’
perceptions of law enforcement are shaped by the vicarious and
collective experiences of their friends and family members, especially
those who have been verbally or physically abused by the police.100 Black
95. See, e.g., Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 991–92 (1999).
96. See Carpiniello, supra note 19, at 361–62.
97. See Susskind, supra note 19, at 346–49; see also Carpiniello, supra note 19, at 356
(advocating for the expansion of the reasonable African American standard into the
specific context of “location plus evasion” stops).
98. Susskind, supra note 19, at 344.
99. Carpiniello, supra note 19, at 357–58.
100. See Yolander G. Hurst et al., The Attitudes of Juveniles Toward the Police: A Comparison
of Black and White Youth, 23 POLICING 37, 49 (2000) (discussing the fact that black youth
are more likely than white youth to have family members who have been verbally or
physically abused by police); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Perceptions of Racial
Profiling: Race, Class, and Personal Experience, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 435, 450 (2002) (same).
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families have long been proactive in transmitting norms on dealing with
the police to their children.101 Black parents tell their children to keep
their hands where police can see them, avoid sudden movements, and
behave in a courteous and respectful manner toward officers.102 For
some black youth, these lessons mean the difference between life and
death. For many black youth, they also transfer negative attitudes and
resentments about the police from one generation to the next as youth
internalize the negative experiences of their community.103
At school, black children’s first encounters with a school resource
officer (“SRO”) will often confirm what their parents have told them.
Notwithstanding policymakers’ efforts to improve the image of police
among students through SRO programs, which are now ubiquitous104
in urban communities, evidence suggests that the current proliferation
of police in schools has done little to improve police-community
relations. SROs remain deeply entrenched in their traditional law
enforcement and crime control roles.105 The visual presence of police
officers—many of whom patrol schools in uniforms with guns, pepper
spray, and batons at their waist106—merely reinforces students’ image

101. See Craig B. Futterman et al., Youth/Police Encounters on Chicago’s South Side:
Acknowledging the Realities, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 138 (noting that black children have had
their expectations about police shaped by conversations with family, friends, and elders).
102. See Ulysses Burley III, Dear Son, “A Letter to My Unborn [Black] Son,” SALT
COLLECTIVE, http://thesaltcollective.org/letter-unbornblack-son (last visited June 1,
2018); Celia K. Dale, A Black Mother’s Painful Letter to Her 8-Year-old Son: How to Behave
in a World that Will Hate and Fear You, ATLANTA BLACK STAR (Nov. 26, 2014),
http://atlantablackstar.com/2014/11/26/letter-son; Geeta Gandbhir & Blair Foster,
Opinion, “A Conversation with My Black Son,” N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/opinion/a-conversation-with-my-blackson.html; see also Ronald Weitzer, Citizens’ Perceptions of Police Misconduct: Race and
Neighborhood Context, 16 JUSTICE Q. 819, 833 (1999) (noting that blacks typically feel
compelled to take more precautions around police than whites).
103. Ronald Weitzer & Rod K. Brunson, Strategic Responses to the Police Among InnerCity Youth, 50 SOC. Q. 235, 250 (2009) [hereinafter Strategic Responses].
104. See Arrick Jackson, Police-School Resource Officers’ and Students’ Perception of the
Police and Offending, 25 POLICING 631, 633 (2002) (explaining that part of an SRO’s
role is to be a model for all police to students).
105. See Brad A. Myrstol, Public Perceptions of School Resource Officer (SRO) Programs,
12 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 20, 21, 35 (2011) (explaining that over seventy percent of
local law enforcement departments serving jurisdictions with more than 100,000
residents maintain an active SRO program); Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource Officers
and the Criminalization of Student Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 280, 281 (2009) (noting that
“school-based policing is the fastest growing area of law enforcement”).
106. Police in Schools:
Arresting Developments, ECONOMIST (Jan. 9, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21685204-minorities-bear-brunt-
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of the police in their punitive capacities. Overly aggressive officers who
treat students “like criminals” undermine students’ respect for law
enforcement,107 and cause students to believe that SROs are
representative of how all officers will treat them.108
Hostile, on-the-street encounters with the police only exacerbate
negative views about law enforcement among black students. In a recent
qualitative study involving young black males in St. Louis, evidence
indicates that black boys expect to be stopped and mistreated.109 Black
boys complain that they are repeatedly peppered with questions like
“Where are you coming from?,” “Where are you going?,” and “Where is
your mother?”110 Black boys and girls complain that police are mean
and disrespectful and do not know how to talk to others, especially black
people.111 Black boys describe police as belligerent and antagonistic and
are especially outraged by the officers’ use of inflammatory language,
including racial slurs, profanity, and demeaning terms like “punk[]” and
“siss[y].”112 When youth watch any of the recent police shootings or
assaults captured on video, they see officers who are visibly hostile and
rude, creating such a negative tone that virtually any child would be
afraid.113 These experiences, combined with developmental features of
adolescence, leave black youth particularly vulnerable to the
aggressive-police-tactics-school-corridors-too-many.
107. Myrstol, supra note 105, at 21; see also LAWRENCE F. TRAVIS III & JULIE K. COON,
THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN PUBLIC SCHOOL SAFETY: A NATIONAL SURVEY 197
(2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211676.pdf; Nicole L. Bracy,
Student Perceptions of High-Security School Environments, 43 YOUTH & SOC’Y 365, 369 (2011).
108. Jackson, supra note 104, at 637, 645–46; see also Myrstol, supra note 105, at 35 (stating
that perceptions of SROs may be correlated with perceptions of the police generally).
109. See Rod. K. Brunson & Jody Miller, Gender, Race, and Urban Policing: The
Experience of African American Youths, 20 GENDER & SOC’Y 531, 535 (2006) [hereinafter
Gender, Race, and Urban Policing].
110. The pervasiveness of these intrusions is debilitating for black boys. Consider
Tremaine McMillian’s encounter with the Miami-Dade officer who demanded that
Tremaine point out his mother, suggesting that he did not believe the fourteen-yearold was legitimately visiting the beach with his family. See Tremaine McMillian, 14-YearOld with Puppy, Choked by Miami-Dade Police Officer over “Dehumanizing Stares” (VIDEO),
HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2013, 9:30 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/05/30/tremaine-mcmillian-14-year-old-miami-dade-police_n_3362340.html.
111. See Gender, Race, and Urban Policing, supra note 109, at 548–49.
112. Id. at 539, 541; see Strategic Responses, supra note 103, at 244.
113. See, e.g., Michael Wines, In Police Shootings, Finding Jurors Who Will Say “Not
Guilty,” N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/us/policeshootings-trial-jury.html (arguing that an increase in police shooting videos showing
the police as the hostile parties has made it difficult for prosecutors to find jurors who
are not biased towards police).
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psychological pressures of police presence.114 As such, black youth are
even less likely than other youth and adults to believe they are free to
leave and decline police contact.
Ironically, the Court in Terry v. Ohio 115 explicitly acknowledged the
tenuous relationship between police, youth, and minorities when it
conceded in a footnote that
the frequency with which “frisking” forms a part of the field
interrogation practice . . . cannot help but be a severely
exacerbating
factor
in
police-community
tensions[,] . . .
particularly . . . in situations where the “stop and frisk” of youths or
minority group members is “motivated by the officers’ perceived
need to maintain the power image of the beat officer.”116

The Court further acknowledged that community resentments
caused by certain police practices is relevant to the courts’ assessments
of an intrusion upon the reasonable expectations of privacy and security
from those practices.117 Notwithstanding these acknowledgements, the
Court dismissed these considerations, stating that “the abusive practices
which play a major . . . role in creating this friction are not susceptible
of control by means of the exclusionary rule, and cannot properly
dictate our decision with respect to the powers of the police in genuine
investigative and preventive situations.”118 Since then, the Court has
been unwilling to use the Fourth Amendment to address abusive and
discriminatory police conduct and has persisted with a reasonable
person standard that obscures the realities of black Americans and
other racial minorities in relation to the police.119
To consider race and assess discriminatory police conduct in critical
Fourth Amendment inquiries, courts will likely have to break free from
the rigid, objective-subjective binary that is common in reasonableness
discourse.120 Debates about the application of subjective and objective
114. See Annitto, supra note 17, at 5 (discussing the psychology of coercion and its
application to police encounters with minors).
115. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
116. Id. at 14 n.11 (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 17 n.14.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that “the
actual motivations of the individual officers” are irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment
analysis and noting that these issues are better left to the Equal Protection Clause).
120. See Victoria Nourse, After the Reasonable Man:
Getting over the
Subjectivity/Objectivity Question, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 33, 36 (2008) (rejecting the purely
subjective and purely objective binary and advocating for a hybrid standard that takes
into account the characteristics of a particular defendant, while at the same time
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standards in the law are rife with questions of power and equality.121 As
Professor Richard Delgado contends, it is often the stronger party who
wants the objective standard to apply and the weaker party who prefers
a more personalized standard.122 The preference for an objective
standard among the members of the dominant group reflects their
allegiance to their own worldview.123 Because the powerful class dictates
the contours of the objective standard, reasonableness becomes selfreferential.124 Over time, the subjective view of the dominant class
becomes the “objective” reasonable view.125 Thus, it is no surprise that
decisions under the objective reasonable-person standard will generally
favor a dominant class.126 Meanwhile, the purportedly “objective”
nature of the standard allows the dominant class to see its preferred
outcomes as fair, just, and principled even when those outcomes are
disproportionately skewed in their favor.127
Professor Victoria Nourse rejects the purely subjective and purely
objective binary and advocates for a hybrid standard that takes into
account the characteristics of a particular defendant while at the same
time offering normative guidance.128 Recognizing that legal rules have
little value absent context, Professor Nourse notes that the law is not
self-applying, but always dependent on context.129 The reasonableness
of some identified behavior is always assessed according to the
context.130 Extrapolating that insight to the seizure analysis, a suspect’s
perspective about whether he is free to leave will be measured against
what a reasonable person in a like “situation” would have perceived.
Race cannot be easily disentangled from the police-civilian context.
B. Race, Adolescence, and Consent to Search
Although this Article focuses primarily on the point at which a police
contact transforms into an investigatory Terry stop, it is important to
offering normative guidance).
121. Delgado, supra note 28, at 817; see Nourse, supra note 120, at 48 (arguing that
debates about subjective and objective standards are debates about equality).
122. Delgado, supra note 28, at 817–18.
123. Id. at 818, 820.
124. Id. at 820.
125. Id. at 818.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 818–19.
128. Nourse, supra note 120, at 35–38.
129. Id. at 35 (arguing that law is not self-applying and that questions of law can
only be answered by “confronting the ways in which law moves from rule to context”).
130. Id. at 36–38.

2018]

THE REASONABLE BLACK CHILD

1535

recognize that stops often escalate rapidly into frisks and full
searches.131 Officers frequently seek a civilian’s consent to frisk or
search.132 Consent allows police to search a person’s body, home, or
possessions without a warrant or probable cause.133 To benefit from
this exception to the warrant requirement, the police must show that
consent was freely given and not the result of express or implied duress
and coercion.134 A suspect’s mere “acquiescence to a claim of lawful
authority” will not constitute consent.135
Courts will consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding
whether consent is voluntary.136 Relevant factors include both the
details surrounding the officer’s request and the characteristics of the
suspect, such as age, education, low intelligence, and the suspect’s lack
of information about constitutional rights.137 Thus, the consent
analysis not only involves an objective evaluation of the facts and
circumstances leading up to the consent, but also a subjective inquiry
that takes into account personal experiences that produce fears and
motivate people to act.138 In this way, the law is arguably already better
suited to accommodate age and race in the determination of
voluntariness of consent.
Although Fourth Amendment inquiries are normed largely on an
objective reasonable person test, subjective considerations are not
foreign to the search and seizure analysis. As one commentator has
observed, the Supreme Court seems to shift (opportunistically)
between subjective and objective tests in both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment contexts.139 For example, while the Supreme Court has
131. Devon W. Carbado, From Stop and Frisk to Shoot and Kill: Terry v. Ohio’s Pathway
to Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1508, 1547–48 (2017) (discussing the litigation of
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), to illustrate that, in
practice, justification for stop may be seen as justification for frisk or search, despite
the requirement of separate reasonable suspicion).
132. See Annitto, supra note 17, at 7 (discussing consent as the most common
exception to the warrant requirement for searches).
133. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is equally well settled
that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a
warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”).
134. Id. at 248.
135. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1968).
136. Id. at 226–27 (analogizing voluntariness of consent to search with the
voluntariness of consent to answer question in an interrogation).
137. Id. at 226.
138. Id. at 229.
139. Kinports, supra note 21, at 77, 93–94 (explaining that, in the exclusionary rule
context, courts oscillate between objective and subjective standards).
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insisted upon on a purely objective inquiry in the Fourth Amendment
seizure analysis,140 the Court has granted more flexibility in the
consent-to-search query.141 The test for voluntariness of consent is a
totality of the circumstances test that accounts for both the subtle and
blatantly coercive nature of police questioning, as well as the “possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents.”142 Factors that
may render a person particularly “vulnerable” to coercion include the
suspect’s young age and mental deficiencies.143 On review, courts will
consider the suspect’s vantage point in determining whether consent
was freely and voluntarily given.144
If we turn back to Andre, we see that a purely objective consent-tosearch test is inadequate. A test that ignores Andre’s race and age leaves
Andre even more vulnerable than a white youth or an adult to subtle
interrogation strategies that coerce youth to consent. The susceptibility
of children to authority figures, like the police, has already been
explored in the seizure analysis above.145 Youth as a class are more
deferential to adults, have less experience with and knowledge about
their legal rights, and have less cognitive capacity to identify and weigh
the advantages and disadvantages of allowing the police to search.146
Moreover, neurological studies show that the section of the brain
responsible for logical reasoning, planning, self-regulation, and impulse
control is still immature in adolescence.147 A youth’s capacity for mature
or deliberate thinking, including the ability to identify and consider
140. Annitto, supra note 17, at 9.
141. See Kinports, supra note 21, at 93–94 (concluding that the Court inexplicably
switches from a reasonable person focus to a subjective standard).
142. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228–29 (recognizing the need to protect citizens from even
subtle forms of coercion by “explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force”).
143. Id. at 226. For state examples, see State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609, 612–13 (Ariz.
2013) (en banc), which considered age and intelligence, and In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497,
502–03 (D.C. 1992) (en banc), which factored in the defendant’s age and maturity.
144. Kinports, supra note 21, at 90–91.
145. See supra Section I.A.
146. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
147. See Brief for the American Medical Ass’n & the American Academy of Child &
Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 14–36, Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 121237, at *14–36
[hereinafter Brief for the American Medical Ass’n] (describing studies that conclude
that adolescent brains have immature cognitive functions and a hyperactive rewarddrive system that results in impulsive behavior); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso,
Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 812
(2005) [hereinafter Developmental Incompetence] (noting that development of the prefrontal cortex continues through adolescence).
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future consequences, understand a possible sequence of events, and
control impulses continues to develop well into young adulthood.148
Teens are also more likely to focus on the short-term, immediate
consequences of a decision rather than the long-term consequences.149
Thus, when the police ask a child to consent to a search, the child may
focus on his desire to terminate the interaction with the police as soon
as possible and fail to identify or give weight to the potential long-term
consequences of the search.150 Since most average adult are unaware
if and when they are truly free to resist a search,151 we should be even
less confident in a child’s knowledge and capacity to refuse.
Moreover, as discussed above, contemporary tensions between
police and the black community further complicate a black youth’s
capacity to refuse consent. The open hostility, fear, and distrust that
exist between the police and black youth creates a psychological
atmosphere that significantly undermines the voluntariness of
consent. If the seizure analysis and the consent-to-search doctrine are
both intended to promote voluntary decision making and free and
unconstrained choice,152 then it is essential that courts consider age
and race in advancing these goals. Although the Supreme Court has
identified age as one of the relevant factors in the voluntariness
doctrine,153 many courts do not explicitly consider age in their totality
148. Levick & Tierney, supra note 11, at 523–24; see Brief for the American Medical
Ass’n, supra note 147, at 14–36 (collecting and summarizing studies); Developmental
Incompetence, supra note 147, at 812.
149. Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 44, at 356–57 (studying
adolescents’ capacities to make decisions related to police interrogation, attorney
consultation, and plea agreements); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future
Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 35–36, 39 (2009) [hereinafter Age
Differences in Future Orientation] (measuring individuals’ self-reported ability to plan
ahead, anticipate consequences, and time perspective and finding that adolescents
aged twelve to fifteen scored significantly lower on planning than individuals older
than fifteen years old).
150. Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 44, at 356 (finding that younger
adolescents, ages eleven to thirteen, have a lower level of comprehension regarding
the long-term impact of their legal decisions, compared to older adolescents, ages
sixteen to seventeen).
151. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on
the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1301 (1990) (“In the real world, however, few
people are aware of their fourth amendment rights, many individuals are fearful of the
police, and police officers know how to exploit this fear.”).
152. Kinports, supra note 21, at 75–76 (arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt
a principled approach that considers the goals of the Fourth Amendment in deciding
whether to consider the officer’s vantage point or the defendant’s vantage point).
153. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); see also Annitto, supra note 17,
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of the circumstances analysis.154 To meaningfully account for these
factors, courts should make explicit findings on the record concerning
the effect of both race and relative immaturity on the voluntariness of
the suspect’s consent.155
II. RACE, ADOLESCENCE, AND THE SUSPICION RUBRIC
Although the Fourth Amendment was originally interpreted to
prohibit state intrusions absent probable cause to believe a person is
committing or had recently committed a crime, the Supreme Court’s
1968 ruling in Terry v. Ohio now permits officers to engage civilians in an
“investigatory stop” based on a much lower and arguably even more
ambiguous standard of “reasonable . . . articulable suspicion.”156 Terry and
its progeny ultimately created two new categories of police-citizen
encounters: “stops,” which are time-limited seizures permitted when
officers have reasonable articulable suspicion to believe a suspect is or has
been engaged in criminal conduct, and “frisks,” which must be preceded
by a lawful stop and are permitted when officers have reasonable
articulable suspicion to believe a suspect is armed and dangerous.157
Absent a warrant or consent to search, the Supreme Court has held
that officers may “stop and frisk” a person only when the officer can
point to reasonable articulable suspicion to justify that intrusion.158
Thus, a Terry stop is reasonable only if the officer can “point to specific
and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from
those facts,” reasonably warrant a belief that a suspect is engaged in or
has been engaged in criminal conduct.159 Although reasonableness
remains the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment analysis, Fourth
at 7 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court has not consistently applied age as a factor).
154. Annitto, supra note 17, at 3, 8–9 (contending that considerations like age seem
to have gotten lost after the Court emphasized the objective nature of the Fourth
Amendment inquiry in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977) (finding
an atmosphere of authoritative control to be an important factor when considering if
consent is freely given); In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 503 (D.C. 1992) (en banc) (requiring
the trial judge to make findings on age and relative immaturity).
156. 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Renee McDonald
Hutchins, Stop Terry: Reasonable Suspicion, Race, and a Proposal to Limit Terry Stops, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 883, 886 (2013) (providing an in-depth critique of Terry’s
erosion of the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard).
157. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 30; LAFAVE, supra note 38, §§ 9.1–9.2 (discussing the
general permissible scope of stops and frisks).
158. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 30.
159. Id. at 21.
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Amendment cases fluctuate between whose vantage point of
reasonableness is controlling.160 While the suspect’s point of view
prevails in the seizure and consent-to-search inquiries,161 the officer’s
vantage point prevails in assessing the quantum of suspicion needed to
justify a Fourth Amendment intrusion.162
Absent consent, a
warrantless seizure is only permissible if an objectively reasonable
police officer, viewing all the circumstances, would believe there was
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.163
To justify a Terry stop and frisk, an officer will consider relevant
objective facts about the suspect and the suspect’s behavior and make
reasonable inferences and judgments from those facts.164 The officer
may consider the time and location of the purported offense as well as
information about the suspect’s conduct, including flight, furtive
gestures, association with known criminals, proximity to a suspected
crime scene, presence in a high-crime area, and response to
questioning.165 To justify a frisk, the officer must demonstrate that he
had reason to believe the suspect was armed and dangerous.166 Factors
include reports of crime involving a weapon, appearance of a bulge in
the suspect’s clothing, sounds of gunfire, and suspect gestures like
grabbing at the waistband area.167
An officer’s objective observations have little value absent the
meaning the officer assigns to those facts. In determining whether the
officer has provided the requisite justification for an intrusion, courts
will review the facts and inferences from the lens of a reasonable police
officer.168 As the Court stated in Illinois v. Wardlow,169 “courts do not
have available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from
suspicious behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific
certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where none exists.
Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on
160. Kinports, supra note 21, at 74, 78.
161. Id. at 89–92.
162. Id. at 79.
163. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
164. Id. at 696–97.
165. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,124 (2000) (high crime area and flight);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66–67 (1968) (furtive gestures); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 159–60 (1925) (relevance of a high crime area). See generally
LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 9.5 (discussing the grounds for a permissible stop).
166. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27 (1968).
167. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 9.5.
168. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22.
169. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
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commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.”170
In Wardlow, the Court assessed “the degree of suspicion that attaches
to a person’s flight” by making “commonsense conclusions” about the
motives behind the suspect’s flight from police.171 In a traditional
reasonable person framework, an individual’s flight tends to convey a
consciousness of guilt and furtive gestures suggest that an individual
has something to hide.172
Part II of this Article considers how race and adolescence affect the
reasonableness of police conduct in at least two critical layers of the
suspicion rubric—distortions in seemingly objective factual observations
and the reasonableness of commonsense judgments made from those
observations. First, sociological and anecdotal evidence suggests that
police interact differently with youth than they do with adults.173
Inherent biases about childhood and adolescence cause police officers
to be hyper-vigilant in their surveillance of young people.174 In
addition, empirical research on implicit racial bias suggests that police
are more likely to interpret ambiguous behavior and innocuous facial
expressions by blacks as violent and aggressive than they would if they
were observing that same behavior and expressions by whites.175 Thus,
what officers perceive as innocent adolescent play among white youth

170. Id. at 124–25.
171. Id. at 128 (internal quotations omitted).
172. Id. at 128–30.
173. See Lisa H. Thurau, Rethinking How We Police Youth: Incorporating Knowledge of
Adolescence into Policing Teens, CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J., Fall 2009, at 30, 30 (describing the
current police approach as believing youths present the same or greater risk than adults).
Thurau is the founder and director of Strategies for Youth, an organization that seeks to
improve police-youth relations and reduce unnecessary referrals of youth to the juvenile
justice system through police training and community education. Staff, STRATEGIES FOR
YOUTH, https://strategiesforyouth.org/about/staff (last visited June 1, 2018).
174. Jackson, supra note 104, at 638.
175. Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence:
Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590,
591 (1976) (noting that among college students, the threshold for labeling an act as
violent is lower when viewing a black committing the same act); Justin D. Levinson &
Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of
Ambiguous Evidence, 112 WEST VA. L. REV. 307, 310 (2010) (finding that mock jurors
primed with a black perpetrator were significantly more likely to find ambiguous
evidence to be indicative of guilt than a white perpetrator); L. Song Richardson, Arrest
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2046–48 (2011) [hereinafter
Arrest Efficiency] (finding that research subjects, who watched videos of a man pushing
another man, found black pushers more violent than white pushers and two black
actors as having a more aggressive interaction that two white actors).
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may appear as threatening, dangerous behavior among black youth.176
Second, the failure to explicitly address race and adolescence in the
reasonable articulable suspicion analysis leaves courts to rely on
outdated and inaccurate assumptions about the meaning of human
behavior in police-civilian encounters in the black community.
Whereas behaviors like flight and furtive gestures may reliably imply
consciousness of guilt for some, there are too many innocent reasons
for black youth to be nervous and flee from police to infer criminal
intent from those behaviors among black youth. This Part urges police
officers and courts to abandon outdated judgments that ignore what
we know about youth from developmental science and fail to account
for the impact of race on reasonable adolescent behavior.
A. Police Surveillance of Youth
Youth in general are more likely than adults to have contact with the
police as they play in the streets, congregate in public spaces, hang out
past curfew, drink alcohol, ride around in cars, and talk or laugh
loudly.177 Police are heavily involved in youths’ lives in America.178
Police engage with youth on the streets, in malls, in schools, in their
homes, and by perusing youths’ activities on social media.179 In the
story that opens this Article, Andre and James were on the street
precisely because they were teenagers in an urban, low-income
neighborhood: they did not have a car, they had time to spare, and they
were moving in a group from one public place to another.
Police contact with youth in black communities is pervasive. Young
black males who move in crowds, “jone,” and “play fight” are even more
likely than young white men, young minority women, and older
minority men to attract attention from the police and experience
verbal abuse, excessive force, unwarranted street stops, and other
negative interactions with police.180 Under the guise of reasonable
articulable suspicion, police stop black boys on the vaguest of
176. Richardson, supra note 175, at 2039–40 (explaining that officers tend to stop
more blacks than whites, but stops of whites will typically be more accurate because
the stops are based on less ambiguous activity).
177. Hurst et al., supra note 100, at 40; Terrance J. Taylor et al., Coppin’ an Attitude:
Attitudinal Differences Among Juveniles Toward Police, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 295, 296 (2001).
178. Thurau, supra note 173, at 30.
179. Id. at 32.
180. See Weitzer & Brunson, supra note 103, at 235; Taylor et al., supra note 177, at
302; see also Kristin Henning, Boys to Men: The Role of Policing in the Socialization of Black
Boys, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN 57, 59 (Angela Davis ed., 2017).
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descriptions—“black boys running,” “two black males in jeans, one in
a gray hoodie,” “black male in athletic gear,” and “black male with a
bicycle.”181 Young black males are treated as if they are “out of place”
not only when they are in white, middle-class neighborhoods, but also
when they are hanging out in public spaces or sitting on their own
front porches.182 Black boys who congregate “on the “corner” attract
police attention at all times of day or night.183 Young black males
cannot escape police surveillance even when they dress nicely or drive
nice cars because such signs of wealth among black youth are
presumed to be associated with drug dealing.184
Police officers bring their own social and psychological assumptions
into each encounter they have with young people. Those assumptions
dictate what officers will expect and often cause them to develop
conscious or subconscious schema for handling youth.185 Officers who
interact with youth have little understanding of adolescent
development and little training in appropriate strategies for
interacting with youth.186 The prevailing approach to policing youth,
especially black, Latino, and immigrant youth, involves excessive
displays of force, a liberal use of arrest power to control youth conduct,
and militarism that underscores the power of the police over the
child.187 There is little tolerance for conflict with and among youth,
and police are encouraged by structural, philosophical, and cultural
factors to take a punitive approach with youth.188 Revisiting the
scenario at the beginning of this Article, it is no surprise that Andre’s
compliance with the “request” to lift his shirt and reveal his waist area
did not satisfy the officers. The officers continued to assert their
181. Kristin Henning & Angela J. Davis, Opinion: How Policing Black Boys Leads to the
Conditioning of Black Men, NPR (May 23, 2017, 12:41 PM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/codeswitch/2017/05/23/465997013/opinion-how-policing-black-boysleads-to-the-conditioning-of-black-men. These examples are drawn from the author’s
own extensive experience representing accused youth in the District of Columbia
juvenile court.
182. Brunson & Miller, supra note 109, at 549; Hurst et al., supra note 100, at 40–41.
183. Henning & Davis, supra note 181.
184. Rod K. Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black People”: African-American Young Men’s
Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 71, 84 (2007) [hereinafter
Police Don’t Like Black People].
185. Jackson, supra note 104, at 638.
186. See Thurau, supra note 173, at 31, 38–39 (finding little evidence of training to
prepare police for youth interaction and noting only one state statute requiring police
training in juvenile matters).
187. Id. at 31–32.
188. Id. at 31.
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authority by asking the boys for permission to search and forcing the
boys to stand with their hands on the wall during a frisk.
B.

The Black Threat: Understanding Implicit Racial Bias &
the Officers’ Interpretation of Innocuous Facts

The impact of implicit bias on decision making has been well
documented in all phases of the criminal justice system.189 Thus, while
Andre’s status as a child already exposes him to heightened surveillance
by the police, his race exposes him to additional stereotypes and
judgments. Police officers who must “synthesize vast amounts of
complex information” in a short period of time to ensure their own
safety and the safety of others rely on cognitive shortcuts in their
observations and judgments during on-the-street encounters with
civilians.190 Cognitive science teaches us that people use cognitive
shortcuts to process and contextualize large volumes of new
information, make sense of other people’s actions, and reduce stress.191
Cognitive shortcuts involving race are referred to as “implicit racial
bias” and include both “unconscious stereotypes (beliefs about social
groups) and attitudes (feelings, either positive or negative, about social
groups).”192 Implicit bias is so subtle that we are generally not aware of
it and may act on it reflexively without realizing it.193 Implicit racial
bias evolves from our repeated exposure to cultural stereotypes in
society194 and is activated by environmental stimuli, including cultural
189. See Kristin Henning, Race, Paternalism, and the Right to Counsel, 54 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 649, 653–57 (2017) (summarizing studies showing evidence of implicit racial bias
in the criminal and juvenile justice systems).
190. Thompson, supra note 95, at 986 (noting police officers rely on categorization
to make quick decisions).
191. Id. at 984–85 (concluding categorization of information provides benefits for
human organization); see also Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and
Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 877 (2004) (explaining that
these associations help differentiate between important and non-important
information); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion
Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 297 (2012) (noting that while cognitive shortcuts allow
humans to make sense of the world around them, these shortcuts may lead to errors
in judgement).
192. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage,
122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2630 (2013) [hereinafter Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage].
193. Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1145 (2000); Jerry Kang, Denying
Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933, 956 (2004); Andrea D.
Lyon, Race Bias and the Importance of Consciousness for Criminal Defense Attorneys,
35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 755, 759 (2012); Arrest Efficiency, supra note 175, at 2043.
194. Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, supra note 192, at 2630.
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stereotypes, that cause us to associate crime and race, particularly
Once stereotypes and biases are
crime and blackness.195
subconsciously triggered, they may evoke negative judgments and
behaviors that are involuntary and unplanned.196 These types of
cognitive biases are not limited to rogue officers who abuse their power
or intentionally target racial minorities with discriminatory motives.
People of all races have implicit racial biases that may negatively affect
their behavior, even those who ardently reject racism and
discrimination and have positive relationships with people of other
races.197 Even black Americans have some implicit racial bias in
associating blackness with crime.198
Implicit racial bias helps explain why Andre was at such a
disadvantage from the moment the officers saw him. Police expect
youth to be anti-authoritarian;199 they expect black boys to be
dangerous.200 Even when police are willing to disregard some youth
behavior as mere adolescence, research suggests that black youth do
not get the benefit of that mitigation. In one study of police
195. See id. at 2630; see also Justin D. Levinson et al., Implicit Racial Bias: A Social
Science Overview, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 9, 10–12 (Justin D. Levinson
& Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (explaining that certain events and stimuli can trigger
specific unconscious decision making and behavior); CHERYL STAATS, KIRWAN INST. FOR
THE STUDY OF RACE & ETHNICITY, STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 36–45
(2013), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-Implicit_Bias.pdf (discussing
studies that measure the association between race and criminality in the criminal
justice context).
196. See Arrest Efficiency, supra note 175, at 2043; Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender
Triage, supra note 192, at 2629–30.
197. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death
Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1540 (2004) (discussing the pervasiveness of
implicit biases in death penalties cases); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2009) (explaining
that even people who “embrace nondiscrimination norms” may still “hold implicit
biases that might lead them to treat black Americans in discriminatory ways”); Arrest
Efficiency, supra note 175, at 2039 (noting that individuals of all races have implicit
biases); see also Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1072 (2006) (discussing studies,
including those in which test subjects have been African American and Latino and
reject racism but still display implicit bias).
198. See Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, supra note 175, at 2634.
199. See Samantha A. Goodrich et al., Evaluation of a Program Designed to Promote
Positive Police and Youth Interactions, OJJDP J. OF JUV. JUST., Spring 2014, at 55, 57
(observing that interactions between police and youths were more likely to result in
an arrest if the youth was disrespectful or hostile).
200. Gender, Race, and Urban Policing, supra note 109, at 532, 534 (“[R]esearch
confirms that young black men typify the ‘symbolic assailant’ in the eyes of the police.”).
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perceptions of childhood innocence, researchers showed police
officers a series of photographs of young white, black, and Latino
males, advised them that the children in the photographs were accused
of either a misdemeanor or a felony, and asked them to estimate the
age of each child.201 While the officers overestimated the age of
adolescent black felony suspects by five years, they underestimated the
age of adolescent white felony suspects by one year.202 Moreover, the
older an officer thought a child was, the more culpable the officer
perceived the child to be of the suspected crime.203 Further nuancing
their study, researchers asked officers to take a “dehumanizing”
implicit association test to determine the extent to which the officers
associated black people with apes.204 This study found that the more
readily participants implicitly associated blacks with apes, the higher
their culpability ratings were for both black misdemeanor and black
felony suspects.205 In a related experiment with university students, the
same researchers found that study subjects perceived youth aged zero
to nine as equally innocent regardless of race, but began to think of
black children as significantly less innocent than other children at
every age group thereafter.206 The perceived innocence of black
children aged ten to thirteen was equivalent to that of non-black
children aged fourteen to seventeen, and the perceived innocence of
black children aged fourteen to seventeen was equivalent to that of
non-black adults aged eighteen to twenty-one.207 These findings
suggest that black youth are more likely to be treated as adults much
earlier than other youth and less likely than white youth to receive the
benefits and special considerations of adolescence.208
The current reasonable articulable suspicion framework obscures
the reality of implicit racial bias when it assumes that officers can
cleanly separate race-neutral “suspicion” from conscious and
unconscious bias.209 The officers’ purported factual observations may
not be “facts” at all, but instead cognitive interpretations of ambiguous

201. Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing
Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 530 (2014).
202. Id. at 531–32.
203. Id. at 532.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 529.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 527.
209. Thompson, supra note 95, at 983.
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or innocuous behavior, influenced by cultural norms and
stereotypes.210 On the street, bias may cause officers to misinterpret
ambiguous behavior to fit prevailing narratives or stereotypes about
black youth.211 The cultural stereotype of “blacks as violent, hostile,
aggressive, and dangerous” is so pervasive within our society,212 the
mere presence of a black male on the street may cause an officer to
anticipate criminal activity or fear for their safety.213
Several studies on implicit racial bias have found that individuals are
more likely to interpret ambiguous behavior by blacks as more
aggressive and consistent with violent intentions while interpreting the
same behavior by whites as harmless.214 In one study, researchers asked
participants to view a brief movie clip in which a target’s facial
expression morphed from unambiguous hostility to unambiguous
happiness and a second clip where the target’s expression did the
reverse.215 Participants with higher levels of implicit bias took longer
to perceive the change of black faces from hostile to friendly, but not
that of white faces.216 In the second clip, participants perceived the
onset of hostility much earlier for black faces than for white faces.217
In another study, researchers asked participants to view a series of
black or white faces and then determine whether some object was
crime-related or neutral.218 Study participants were more likely to see
crime-related objects when associating the object with a black face
rather than with a white face.219
Studies on police shootings confirm suspicions that police perceive
blacks to be more dangerous in spontaneous encounters. In one 2007
study, researchers randomly selected 124 patrol police officers and 135
civilians to play a video game simulation in which they were confronted
with a black or white person and were asked to shoot if the person was
210. Id. at 987.
211. Id. at 987 nn.160–61.
212. Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, supra note 192, at 2630.
213. See Eberhardt et al., supra note 191, at 890.
214. Levinson & Young, supra note 175, at 310–11 (explaining that when mock
jurors were primed with a black perpetrator, they were significantly more likely to find
ambiguous evidence to be more indicative of guilt than with a white perpetrator);
Arrest Efficiency, supra note 175, at 2046–48.
215. Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice
and the Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 640 (2003).
216. Id. at 642.
217. Id.
218. Eberhardt et al., supra note 191, at 886.
219. Id.
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armed or to press a “don’t shoot” button as quickly as possible if the
person was unarmed.220 Although officers were better able than civilians
to differentiate between armed and unarmed targets, the results showed
clear evidence of racial bias among both police officers and civilians.221
Both police officers and civilians were faster at shooting black targets than
white targets, and police officers were slower to make correct decisions
when faced with either an unarmed black man or an armed white man.222
In a 2005 study, police officers were initially more likely to mistakenly
shoot unarmed black suspects than unarmed white suspects.223 However,
over time, participation in the simulation resulted in a shift from a liberal
bias toward shooting in early trials to a more conservative response in later
trials involving both black and white suspects.224
Given the demonstrated impact of bias on police and other criminal
justice actors, race must be meaningfully considered in assessing the
reliability of an officer’s objective facts and decision to stop a black
youth. An officer’s report of “furtive gestures,” “evasive” eye movements,
and “excessive nervousness” may all be distorted by stereotypes about
race and adolescence.
C. The Reasonableness of Suspect Behavior:
Commonsense Conclusions About Race and Adolescence
Even assuming the officers’ factual observations are reliable and not
unduly distorted by implicit biases, the officer’s suspicion may still be
distorted by the meaning he or she assigns to those observations.
Although the Court articulated a lower quantum of evidence needed

220. Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in
the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1009 (2007) [hereinafter
Across the Thin Blue Line]; see also Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using
Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1314, 1317 (2002) (reporting the results of shooter-paradigm videogame in
which undergraduate students and randomly selected people were quicker to shoot
black targets as compared to white, made more mistakes in shooting more unarmed
black targets (false alarms) than unarmed white targets and failing to shoot more
armed white targets (misses) than armed black targets).
221. See Across the Thin Blue Line, supra note 220, at 1015 (comparing the implicit
racial bias of police officers with the average citizen).
222. See id. at 1015, 1017.
223. See E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police
Officers’ Responses to Criminal Subjects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180, 181 (2005) (highlighting
further research that shows the pervasiveness of implicit bias in police officers).
224. Id. at 182.
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to justify an investigative Terry stop,225 the reasonable articulable
suspicion standard requires more than mere “inarticulate hunches.”226
It requires more than an officer’s intuitive sense that a person “looked
suspicious.”227 To provide the requisite suspicion, an officer must
identify facts and observations that are specific, objective, and largely
race-neutral unless race is an identifying factor in an otherwise
sufficiently detailed description.228 The standard allows the officer to
consider the totality of the circumstances but highlights specific factors
that reasonably contribute to that analysis.229 Factors include the
activities of the person being stopped, the officer’s knowledge about
the person, the area in which the activity is taking place, and the
person’s immediate reaction or response when approached and
questioned by the officer.230 Within this broad framework, police may
infer nefarious intent from a person’s flight, furtive gestures, presence
in a high crime neighborhood, association with known offenders,
knowledge of recently reported crime in the area, presence in a
particular location at an unusual time of day, and exchange of items
believed to be contraband.231
The totality of the circumstances standard also allows officers to infer
criminal intent from a collection of otherwise innocuous facts. For
example, in Terry the officer inferred criminality from Terry’s actions of
pacing in front of a store, gazing into the store window, and conferring
with a third man—each of which the Court itself acknowledged were
innocuous behaviors not indicative of criminal activity.232 On review, the
Court concluded that the officer’s thirty-nine years of professional
225. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
226. Id. at 21–22; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 73 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (“There must be something at least in the activities of the person being
observed on or in his surroundings that affirmatively suggests particular criminal
activity, completed, current, or intended.”).
227. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
228. Thompson, supra note 95, at 967–69, 975–77 (discussing the Court’s reliance
on specific, objective facts and omission of race in Terry to explain the officer’s stop of
Terry, and appropriate use of race); see, e.g., United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79, 81
(8th Cir. 1976) (finding that the officer was justified in making an investigative stop
because the defendant drove a car similar to one described over police radio).
229. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000); United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
230. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 9.5 (detailing what constitutes a
permissible stop).
231. See, e.g., Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (articulating that flight and presence in a
high crime area can be grounds for reasonable suspicion).
232. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1968).
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experience and knowledge of the patterns of criminal activity were
sufficient to validate the stop.233
In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct, courts will evaluate
the officer’s inferences from the lens of a reasonable police officer
viewing similar facts and circumstances.234 As the Court noted in Terry,
In justifying the particular intrusion[,] the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the
intrusion . . . . And in making that assessment it is imperative that
the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search
“warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the action
taken was appropriate?235

Notwithstanding the Court’s endorsement of an objective, raceneutral standard to undergird the Fourth Amendment stop-and-frisk
framework, race and adolescence cannot be extracted from the
interpretation of most common justifications for a stop. Some factors—
such as presence in a high crime neighborhood—are so intertwined
with race that they have become a proxy for race.236 Unless the police
and courts meaningfully evaluate the role of race and adolescence in the
suspicion rubric and revisit the traditional judgments and inferences
that are frequently assigned to behaviors by blacks and youth, black
children will continue to be disproportionately targeted by the police.
1. Flight and refusal to rooperate
A child’s flight from the police is a clear example of how race and
age together negate the inference of guilt that might otherwise flow
from a youth’s avoidance of or refusal to cooperate with the police. In
233. Id. at 23.
234. Id. at 21–22; see Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25 (“[C]ourts do not have available
empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot
reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where none
exists. Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense
judgments and inferences about human behavior.” (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418)).
235. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22; see also Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 (“The analysis proceeds
with various objective observations, information from police reports . . . and
consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.
From these data, a trained officer draws inferences and deductions—inferences and
deductions that might well elude an untrained person.”).
236. See Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J.
423, 493 (2004) (“Thus ‘high crime area’ becomes a centerpiece of the Terry analysis,
serving almost as a talismanic signal justifying investigative stops. Location in America,
in this context, is a proxy for race and ethnicity.”).
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the scenario we have been examining throughout this Article, Andre
did not flee. Maybe he saw no way out, with four uniformed officers
and a marked police car at his side. Maybe he was terrified the officers
would shoot him in the back if he walked away. Regardless, Andre
faced a dilemma that many black boys face when they are confronted
by the police: to either blindly comply with whatever the police say to
avoid getting hurt (and thereby submit to a seizure) or run as fast as
possible to get out of there.237
Although courts have long given lip service to the notion that
civilians have a right to avoid the police and go about their business,238
that notion has been undermined by an equally long-standing
inference that an individual’s “flight” from the presence of police
conveys a consciousness of guilt.239 Relying on commonsense
judgments about human behavior, police and courts assume that a
person who runs has something to hide.240 However, as with other
aspects of the Fourth Amendment doctrine, assumptions about the
meaning of flight need to be reexamined in light of recent
developmental science and the evolving reasonable child standard. As
the Court held in J.D.B., a child’s age itself generates its own set of
commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception.241 A child’s
decision to flee may be impulsive, emotional, or rebellious, particularly
in the face of perceived unfairness.242 Adolescent decision making is
often compromised by cognitive and psychosocial immaturity.243
Cognitive immaturity refers to “deficiencies in the way adolescents
237. See Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 (Mass. 2016) (emphasizing
that racial profiling of black males has conditioned them to run from police).
238. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983) (holding that a person
may decline to listen to police officer questions at all and may go on his way); Smith v.
United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316 (D.C. 1989) (“Leaving a scene hastily may be
inspired . . . by a legitimate desire to avoid contact with the police. A citizen has as
much prerogative to avoid the police as he does to avoid any other person, and his
efforts to do so, without more, may not justify his detention.”).
239. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
240. See Warren, 58 N.E.3d at 341.
241. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011) (citing Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 674 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
242. David E. Arredondo, Child Development, Children’s Mental Health and the Juvenile
Justice System: Principles for Effective Decision-Making, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 13 n.2
(2003) (describing the propensity of children to react negatively in the face of
perceived unfairness).
243. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741,
742–43 (2000); Scott-Hayward, supra note 44, at 62.
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think”; psychosocial immaturity refers to “deficiencies in adolescents’
social and emotional capability.”244 Even when adolescents’ cognitive
capacities begin to approximate those of an adult, deficiencies in their
psychosocial capacities compromise decision making well into late
adolescence and early adulthood.245 As discussed in Part II, the region
of the brain associated with impulse control, risk assessment, and
moral reasoning is still developing well into late adolescence.246 The
adolescent brain reaches heightened emotional reactivity before it
develops the capacity to regulate those emotions.247 As a result, youth
as a class tend to be more impulsive, less risk averse than adults, and
prefer short-term gains.248 Youth are also less able than adults to
envision the danger inherent in a particular behavior.249 Even when
youth can anticipate the long-term consequences of a given course of
conduct, they tend to make impetuous decisions and actions,250
especially when they are under stress.251
Youth are also more susceptible to the influence of others—both
peers and adults.252 It is not a myth that teens are more sensitive than
adults to the perceived and actual influences of their peers.253 Peer

244. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 143, at 742–43.
245. Steinberg & Scott, supra note 45, at 1011–12; see also Cauffman & Steinberg,
supra note 243, at 756–57.
246. Levick & Tierney, supra note 11, at 523–24 (citation omitted); see supra
notes 147–51 and accompanying text.
247. Laurence Steinberg, A Behavioral Scientist Looks at the Science of Adolescent Brain
Development, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 160, 161–62 (2010).
248. See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 45, at 1012 (noting that adolescents are
generally less risk adverse than adults). See generally Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Age
Differences in Affective Decision Making as Indexed by Performance on the Iowa Gambling Task,
46 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 193, 206 (2010) (providing perspectives on age
differences and risk taking); Age Differences in Future Orientation, supra note 149, at 28
(using an increasing risk dynamic paradigm in which probability of a negative outcome
increases with each additional decision to measure risky decision making).
249. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
250. Id. at 569.
251. B.J. Casey & Kristina Caudle, The Teenage Brain: Self Control, 22 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 82, 82–87 (2013) (finding that juveniles’ cognitive capacity
is undermined in circumstances that are not controlled, deliberate and calm); Bernd
Figner et al., Affective and Deliberative Processes in Risky Choice: Age Differences in Risk
Taking in the Columbia Card Task, 35 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 709, 728 (2009)
(finding that in emotionally laden settings adolescents were more likely to make risky
decisions compared to children and adults).
252. Steinberg & Scott, supra note 45, at 1012.
253. See Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk
Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study,
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influence can be direct (e.g., friends encouraging others to do
something risky like run from the police) or indirect (e.g., doing
something risky to avoid peer rejection even in the absence of direct
pressure).254 Given that youth frequently hang out in groups during
adolescence, susceptibility to peer influence during the teen years
cannot be underestimated.255 When one child runs, they all run—
regardless of guilt or innocence.256 To expect anything else is
unrealistic and creates unwarranted suspicion.
Acknowledging that flight from the police does not create suspicion
per se, some courts have tried to honor the individual’s right to avoid
the police by inferring consciousness of guilt only when the suspect has
engaged in some “headlong flight” or “fleeing” that manifests a real,
immediate, and urgent desire to escape.257 This distinction is of little,
if any, benefit for a youth who runs as fast as he can out of impulse.
Among youth as a class, there are too many innocent reasons a child
might run to warrant a fair and reasonable conclusion that their flight
conveys consciousness of guilt.258
When we add race to these adolescent indiscretions, the link between
flight and consciousness of guilt becomes even more tenuous. In United
States v. Drayton,259 the Court asserted that the presence of a uniformed
and visibly armed officer “is cause for assurance, not discomfort.”260 As
41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 629 (2005) (summarizing the results of a study that
found that teens took more risks in a driving game when their peers were in the room
than adults in the same situation); see also Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan,
Age Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531, 1536
(2007) (discussing a study finding that individuals capacity to resist peer pressure
grows linearly between ages fourteen to eighteen, but after eighteen there is not much
evidence of further growth).
254. Gardner & Steinberg, supra note 253, at 625–26.
255. Id. at 625.
256. See id. (finding that adolescents are more likely to follow their peers and make
riskier decisions when with peer groups).
257. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); see also Smith v. United States,
558 A.2d 312, 317 (D.C. 1989) (finding no reasonable articulable suspicion when
suspect neither ran nor bolted); State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 648 (Iowa 2002)
(holding that certain facts coupled with headlong flight is sufficient for reasonable
suspicion). But see Wilson v. United States, 802 A.2d 367, 370 (D.C. 2002) (rejecting
argument that only “headlong flight” meets the test of Wardlow).
258. See Lourdes M. Rosado, Minors and the Fourth Amendment: How Juvenile Status
Should Invoke Different Standards for Searches and Seizures on the Street, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
762, 781–82 (1996) (highlighting multiple reasons why juvenile actions must be
treated differently in Fourth Amendment contexts).
259. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
260. Id. at 204.
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the Court further opined, “That most law enforcement officers are
armed is a fact well known to the public. The presence of a holstered
firearm thus is unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter
absent active brandishing of the weapon.”261 Quite to the contrary, the
current strain in police-black relations give black Americans little reason
to be comforted by the presence of an armed officer. Several federal and
state courts have already acknowledged that innocent minorities
sometimes flee from the scene of a crime for entirely innocent reasons,
including a desire to avoid unwarranted harassment by the police, fear
of being apprehended for a crime they did not commit, and fear of
physical injury or even death at the hands of an officer.262 As Justice
Stevens pointed out in his concurrence in Wardlow:
Among some citizens, particularly minorities . . . there is also the
possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or
without justification, believes that contact with the police can itself
be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the
officer’s sudden presence. For such a person, unprovoked flight is
neither “aberrant” nor “abnormal.” Moreover, these concerns and
fears are known to the police officers themselves, and are validated
by law enforcement investigations into their own practices.
...
The probative force of the inferences to be drawn from flight is a
function of the varied circumstances in which it occurs.263

More recently, one state court was even more assertive in its rejection
of flight as a reliable indicator of guilt for black males.264 In 2016, in
Commonwealth v. Warren,265 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held
that officers had no reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Jimmy
Warren given the vagueness of the suspect description, the lapse of
time between the reported burglary and the stop of Warren, and
Warren’s distance from the location of the reported crime at the time
he was stopped.266 In declining to treat Warren’s purported “flight”
from the police as a meaningful contributing factor in the officers’
261. Id. at 205.
262. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132–33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (highlighting citizen’s fears over contact with police as a potential reason for
flight); see also In re T.L.L., 729 A.2d 334, 341–42 (D.C. 1999) (finding flight not
sufficient for reasonable articulable suspicion when respondent and his companions
“rapid[ly] retreat[ed]” into the house when police approached).
263. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132–33, 135 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
264. Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342–43 (Mass. 2016).
265. 58 N.E.3d 333 (Mass. 2016).
266. Id. at 342–43.

1554

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1513

suspicion, Justice Hines wrote,
Where the suspect is a black male stopped by the police on the
streets of Boston, the analysis of flight as a factor in the reasonable
suspicion calculus cannot be divorced from the findings in a recent
Boston Police Department . . . report documenting a pattern of
racial profiling of black males in the city of Boston . . . . We do not
eliminate flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis
whenever a black male is the subject of an investigatory stop.
However, in such circumstances, flight is not necessarily probative of
a suspect’s state of mind or consciousness of guilt. Rather, the
finding that black males in Boston are disproportionately and
repeatedly targeted for [field interrogation observation] encounters
suggests a reason for flight totally unrelated to consciousness of
guilt. Such an individual, when approached by the police, might just
as easily be motivated by the desire to avoid the recurring indignity
of being racially profiled as by the desire to hide criminal activity.
Given this reality for black males in the city of Boston, a judge
should, in appropriate cases, consider the report’s findings in
weighing flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.267

A black youth’s flight from the police is just as likely to reflect a
personal desire to avoid contact with a corrupt system as it is to be
consciousness of guilt. Given the myriad of negative direct and
indirect contacts young black males have with the police, it is no
surprise that black boys have an especially low opinion of the police,
particularly in socioeconomically disadvantaged communities where
friction between the police and citizens is common.268 Research shows
that while youth in general have less favorable views about the police
than adults, black youth have even less favorable attitudes toward the
police than white youth.269 Unlike white youth, who tend to see police
misconduct as an aberration, black male youth experience that
misconduct as ubiquitous.270
Black boys are angered not only by the sheer number of police
267. Id. at 342; see also In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 513 (D.C. 1997) (Mack, J., dissenting)
(“I respectfully venture to suggest that no reasonable innocent black male (with any
knowledge of American history) would feel free to ignore or walk away from a drug
interdicting team.”).
268. See Goodrich & Anderson, supra note 199, at 87 (describing the importance of
community context in shaping perceptions of police).
269. Police Don’t Like Black People, supra note 184, at 71, 74; Yolander G. Hurst &
James Frank, How Kids View Cops: The Nature of Juvenile Attitudes Toward the Police, 28 J.
CRIM. JUST. 189, 200 (2000); Taylor et al., supra note 177, at 302.
270. See, e.g., Strategic Responses, supra note 103, at 252–53 (examining youths’
responses to police in three neighborhoods in St. Louis, Missouri).
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officers patrolling their neighborhoods but also by the frequency with
which they are stopped.271 Black boys complain of persistent pedestrian
stops, vehicle stops, and the assignment of specialized units and
detectives to patrol their neighborhoods, making their friends and
relatives reluctant to visit.272 Children grow up watching their friends
and family members accosted for minor infractions like not wearing a
seat belt, having car windows too tinted, and playing the radio too
loud.273 Black boys are offended by repeated orders to “sit or lie on the
pavement”274 and resent strip searches and cavity probes, especially
when there is no obvious rationale for such an order.275 Boys
interviewed in St. Louis reported that the “vast majority of their
involuntary police contacts”—and harassment from the police—
occurred when they were not doing anything wrong.276 With
frustration at the “officers’ apparent inability to distinguish law-abiding
residents from those engaged in crime,” the boys resented stops that
seemed arbitrary and baseless and quickly learned to avoid contact
with the police at all costs.277
Black boys who live in a society where police-on-black violence is
commonplace have every reason to flee to avoid physical injury. Police
stops involving black boys are routinely initiated by some physical
contact such as grabbing, pushing, shoving, pulling, or tackling the
youth to the ground.278 Black youth complain of harassment, physical
violence, and other forms of police misconduct as extreme as taking
money from suspects, driving suspects around the city instead of taking
them to the police station, and dropping suspects off in unfamiliar or
rival neighborhoods.279 Other aggressive police tactics include teams of
271. Id. at 235–36.
272. Id. at 241.
273. Gender, Race, and Urban Policing, supra note 109, at 543.
274. Police Don’t Like Black People, supra note 184, at 81; see also Gender, Race, and Urban
Policing, supra note 109, at 540 (describing an experience that is consistent with this
author’s clients’ experience in D.C.).
275. Gender, Race, and Urban Policing, supra note 109, at 548.
276. See, e.g., Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Injustice, Lost Legitimacy,
and Self-Help: Young Males’ Adaptions to Perceived Unfairness in Urban Policing Tactics,
31 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 132, 141 (2015).
277. Id. at 142–43.
278. See, e.g., Michael E. Miller, Calif. Police Officer Scuffles with 16-Year-Old over Walking
in the Bus Lane, WASH. POST (September 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/18/calif-cop-scuffles-with-16-year-old-over-walkingin-the-bus-lane (reporting that a black teenager was struck with a baton by a police
officer after being told to exit a bus lane and allegedly talking back to the officer).
279. Police Don’t Like Black People, supra note 184, at 85–86. Sadly, these rides sound
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plainclothes officers called “jump out boys” who drive up fast to street
corners, jump out to grab and search youth on the streets, and shove
their hands in the youths’ mouths in search of drugs.280 Even more
violent encounters involve billy clubs or chokeholds, like the one that
killed Eric Garner in New York.281 Fear of violence by police is now the
norm for black boys. Instead of looking to police for protection, young
black males see police as a primary source of potential danger. As young
black males internalize the lessons they acquire about police from their
families, schools, and communities, their views and reactions to the
police—like running—become unconscious and automatic.282
2. Hostility, nervousness, response to questions, and furtive gestures
By all accounts, Andre cooperated with the police—either willfully
or by tacit resignation to the authority of the police to stop black boys.
Had Andre refused to cooperate, there is little doubt the police would
have justified their stop and frisk with a litany of facts describing
Andre’s apparent nervousness, hostility, furtive movements,
questioning of the officer’s authority, and refusal to listen, answer, or
cooperate with the police. Although none of these factors alone would
provide the requisite justification for a stop, they would all add to the
officer’s expert assessment of the totality of the circumstances.283
eerily similar to the “rough ride” that Freddie Gray experienced in Baltimore leading
up to his tragic death from injuries. See Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Officer Goodson,
Driver of Freddie Gray, Faces the Most Serious Charges, BALT. SUN (Jan. 9, 2016),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-goodson-trialpreview-20160108-story.html; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV.,
INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 34, 67, 85–87 (2016)
[hereinafter INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT],
https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download (chronicling police misconduct
and harassment against Baltimore Youths).
280. Police Don’t Like Black People, supra note 184, at 88.
281. Joseph Goldstein & Marc Santora, Staten Island Man Died from Chokehold During
Arrest, Autopsy Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/
02/nyregion/staten-island-man-died-from-officers-chokehold-autopsy-finds.html; Kyle
Munzenrieder, Miami-Dade Police Choke Black Teenager Because He Was Giving Them
“Dehumanizing Stares,” MIAMI NEW TIMES (May 29, 2013, 3:09 PM),
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/miami-dade-police-choke-black-teenagerbecause-he-was-giving-them-dehumanizing-stares-6548482.
282. See Goodrich & Anderson, supra note 199, at 86–87 (explaining that
community context can inform how individuals interpret another’s behavior).
283. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (stating that refusal to
cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification
needed for a seizure); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (recognizing that “[t]he
fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is
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Like flight, furtive gestures and nervousness are frequently cited as
evidence that a suspect has something to hide.284 A suspect’s hostility
and refusal to answer questions only heighten that suspicion.285 Factors
like furtive gestures and nervousness are even more ambiguous and
unreliable than flight as an indicator of criminal intent when evaluated
from the lens of adolescent development. A youth who talks back to
police in front of peers may simply be acting out to get attention,
protect their reputation, or mask their fears.286 Notwithstanding
youths’ general perception that they must comply with the commands
of adult authority figures,287 adolescence is also characterized as a
period of rebellion, bravado, and resistance—especially in the face of
perceived injustice.288 Common developmental features of youth, such
as impulsivity and challenging authority, increase the chances that
police encounters with youth will involve conflict and confrontation.289
Children are particularly sensitive to issues of fairness and respect.290
Black youth who resent excessive police presence in their
neighborhoods may be particularly hostile and disrespectful to law
enforcement, exacerbating perceptions and assumptions that they are
engaged in criminal activity.291 In the St. Louis studies, black boys
quickly learned that even obeying the law does little to insulate them
from police suspicion and physical violence.292 In fact, as the

not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct”);
see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (concluding that evasive and
nervous behavior combined with headlong flight in a high narcotics area was enough
to justify a Terry stop and protective pat down).
284. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor
in determining reasonable suspicion.” (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 885 (1975)).
285. Consider Emilio Mayfield’s refusal to stop walking when the officer ordered
him to do so and Tremaine McMillian’s clenched fist as he walked away from the
officer on the beach. Miller, supra note 278; Munzenrieder, supra note 281; Tremaine
McMillian, 14-Year-Old with Puppy, Choked by Miami-Dade Police over “Dehumanizing
Stares,” YOUTUBE (May 31, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pB3hjlpstm0.
286. Thurau, supra note 173, at 37.
287. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
288. Thurau, supra note 173, at 31.
289. Id.
290. Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Anticipatory Injustice Among Adolescents: Age and
Racial/Ethnic Differences in Perceived Unfairness of the Justice System, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
207, 209 (2008).
291. See Police Don’t Like Black People, supra note 184, at 83 (noting that young black men
are “particularly frustrated” when police stop them without any seeming basis for suspicion).
292. Id. at 88.

1558

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1513

researchers in St. Louis concluded, being innocent could actually
increase a young man’s chance of being assaulted, as he is more likely
to challenge the inappropriateness of the officers’ actions.293 Even
when children remember their parents’ advice about the dangers of
talking back to the police, they lack the emotional capacity to regulate
their emotions and impulses, especially in fast-paced, emotionally
charged situations like those involving the police.294 Consistent with
the developmental research outlined throughout this Article,
adolescents have a hard time focusing on the likely consequences of
their actions and making rational decisions in the heat of the
moment.295 Moreover, a child’s aggression or reticence to engage with
police may arise out of developmental disabilities and language
impairments, which occur at significantly elevated rates among youth
in the juvenile justice population.296
Children with language
impairments often have difficulty following direction, recognizing and
articulating emotions, reading social cues, identifying and controlling
inappropriate behavior, and interpreting the motivations and
thoughts of others.297
3. Presence in high crime area, proximity to suspected crime scene,
association with known criminals, and “known to the officer”
Police routinely cite the “high crime rate” of a neighborhood to
justify a stop or arrest.298 The reference is so common that it has been
called a “talismanic litany.”299 Unfortunately, thousands of citizens live
293. Id. at 95–96.
294. Dustin Albert & Laurence Steinberg, Judgment and Decision Making in
Adolescence, 21 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 211, 216–20 (2011) (arguing that socioemotional stimuli paired with adolescents’ immature self-regulatory skills hinders
decision making); Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults?
Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM.
PSYCHOL. 583, 592 (2009) (finding that adolescents decision making is less mature than
adults in situations of emotional arousal or social coercion).
295. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 243, at 748–49, 754, 759; Laurence Steinberg
et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report:
Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1764, 1774–76 (2008).
296. See Michelle LaVigne & Gregory Van Rybroek, “He Got in My Face so I Shot Him”:
How Defendants’ Language Impairments Impair Attorney-Client Relationships, 17 CUNY L.
REV. 69, 71, 75–76 (2013) (stating that children with speech and language impairments
are more likely to be arrested than their peers).
297. Id. at 75–77.
298. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 781 A.2d 729, 735 (D.C. 2001) (describing the
location of the search as a “high narcotics area”).
299. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316 (D.C. 1989) (en banc) (stating

2018]

THE REASONABLE BLACK CHILD

1559

and go about their legitimate day-to-day activities in areas identified as
high-crime areas. The parroting of phrases like “high crime area” to
conjure up inferences of chaos and crime without regard to the
nuances of the circumstances deprive inner city youth of equity in
Fourth Amendment protections.300 The fact that an individual was
observed in or near a purportedly high crime area does not objectively
lend any sinister connotation to facts that are otherwise innocuous on
their face. Black youth are particularly penalized by this factor. Not
only do they live in neighborhoods with a higher police presence, but
poor black youth who live in small crowded apartments are also more
likely to play outside where they will be seen and engaged by the police.
The “high crime” label is especially problematic when it refers to a
“neighborhood” or “area” that is overbroad and imprecise. Entire
sectors of an urban city may fall within this designation. Absent a recent
and specific report of crime at the precise location where the suspect is
observed, the high crime factor should be removed from the suspicion
rubric, even as a contributing factor.
Another closely related factor in the reasonable articulable suspicion
analysis is an individual’s apparent association with known criminals.301
Given the frequent and disproportionate arrest of black Americans, it
is hard to find a black child who does not have a friend or relative who
has not been arrested or “known to the police.”302 Adolescents are
particularly loyal to their friends and family. Thus, even when they
that regardless of the “talismanic litany,” the high crime rate of a neighborhood alone is
not enough to give an officer reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).
300. See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text (explaining how Terry means
that officers do not violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights by stopping them
simply for being in a high crime area).
301. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90 (1979) (finding that where police had a
warrant to search a tavern known for narcotics activity and a bartender working there,
police could not Terry frisk anyone there without individualized reasonable suspicion);
Hemsley v. United States, 547 A.2d 132, 135 (D.C. 1988) (holding that observations of
a car lawfully parked in a high narcotics area, with three occupants, windows rolled up,
and excessive smoke inside were held not to support more than mere suspicion and
Terry stop not valid).
302. Crime in the United States 2015: Table 43A: Arrests by Race and Ethnicity, FED.
BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.2015/tables/table-43 (last visited June 1, 2018) (reporting that in 2015, 69.7% of
people arrested were white and 26.6% were black); see JOSHUA ROVNER, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, POLICY BRIEF: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN YOUTH COMMITMENTS AND
ARRESTS 1, 6 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/
04/Racial-Disparities-in-Youth-Commitments-and-Arrests.pdf (explaining that African
American juveniles are more likely to be arrested than their white peers).
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have a choice about with whom they will spend time, they are not likely
to abandon friends and family who have been targeted by the police.303
Black youth are even more likely to side with friends and family as
compared to police officers they perceive as corrupt and racist.
III. REGULATING POLICE CONDUCT: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ITS LIMITS
To be sure, there will be considerable resistance to any Fourth
Amendment interpretation that asks officers and trial courts to relax the
test for determining whether there has been a seizure or to omit longstanding considerations like flight and high crime neighborhoods from
the rubric of reasonable articulable suspicion.
A. Anticipating the Objections
This Part examines likely objections to the consideration of race and
adolescence in the search and seizure doctrine and argues that any
inconveniences for police are outweighed by the need to ensure that
black youth benefit from the full protections of the Fourth
Amendment.
1. No monolithic “Reasonable Black Person”
The evolution of an objective, reasonable child standard in J.D.B. v.
North Carolina was possible largely because there are “commonsense
conclusions” that can be made about children’s behavior and abilities
that “apply broadly to children as a class.”304 Noting that a child’s age is
“different,”305 the Court set age apart from other subjective factors in the
custody analysis.306 Conclusions about age are “self-evident to anyone
who was a child once himself, including any police officer or judge.”307
Detractors from the arguments in favor of a reasonable black child
standard might fairly ask whether there are similar “commonsense
conclusions” that can be made about black Americans and black
children, in particular.
Whereas age is a quantifiable, unambiguous fact that is often readily
identifiable by physical appearance, race is arguably a social
construct.308 Unlike age, which most people experience in fairly

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 272.
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Pierce, Why Teaching About Race as a Social Construct Still
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universal developmental trajectories of maturity, rationality, and
emotional capacity, people will express and experience race differently
in their day-to-day lives.309 For some, race will be difficult to visually
ascertain.310 Others may decline to identify with any particular race or
reject meanings commonly associated with an outward physical
appearance.311 There are certainly middle-class, suburban black youth
who have never feared police in quite the same way as poor, urban,
inner city black youth might fear police, but that distinction is
increasingly less true today.312 Even youth who do not experience
heavy police surveillance in their own neighborhoods share the
vicarious trauma of perceived police-on-black violence through the
news, internet, and social media.313 Middle-class black parents have
been equally compelled to warn their children of the need to avoid or
cooperate with police.314 Focusing on the variability of race obscures
the broad and largely indisputable evidence of tension between black
Americans and the police and underestimates the impact of race on
youth-police interactions in the Fourth Amendment framework.
Moreover, just as there is no monolithic black person, there is also
no one monolithic “child.” Children raised in different schools,
different socioeconomic classes, and in different families will develop

Matters, 29 SOC. F. 259, 259 (2014); cf. Margaret Shih et al., The Social Construction of
Race: Biracial Identity and Vulnerability to Stereotypes, 13 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC
MINORITY PSYCHOL. 125, 125 (2007).
309. Shih, supra note 308, at 125.
310. See David Gilbert, Interrogating Mixed-Race: A Crisis of Ambiguity?, 11 SOC.
IDENTITIES 55, 64 (2005) (discussing how physical appearance and social networks can
impact racial identity as much as actual racial composition).
311. Shih, supra note 308, at 126.
312. See Hurst & Frank, supra note 269, at 200 (explaining that suburban youth are
more likely than urban youth to have a favorable view of police).
313. See, e.g., Kenya Downs, When Black Death Goes Viral, It Can Trigger PTSD-Like
Trauma, PBS (July 22, 2016, 8:04 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/ blackpain-gone-viral-racism-graphic-videos-can-create-ptsd-like-trauma (citing research
suggesting that for people of color, frequent exposure to the shootings of black people,
including through graphic videos, can have long-term mental health effects); Imani J.
Jackson, The Trauma of Police Brutality, USA TODAY (Sept. 2, 2016, 11:39 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/spotlight/2016/09/02/traumapolice-brutality-column/89019122 (discussing the psychological damage of watching
police brutality on people of color); Jenna Wortham, Racism’s Psychological Toll,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/24/
magazine/racisms-psychological-toll.html (reporting that events experienced
vicariously through social medial or the news may cause “race-based stress reactions”).
314. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
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at different paces and likely perceive police differently.315 Yet,
notwithstanding these obvious nuances and distinctions, Justice
Sotomayor and a majority of the Court in J.D.B. concluded that the
immaturity of youth is such a prevalent fact—despite the exceptions—
that the balance tips in favor of incorporating age into the custody
analysis, and arguably giving youth heightened protection through a
“reasonable child” standard.316 The same is true of race. Although
there is no equivalent body of quantitative research demonstrating
how black youth as a class respond to police, as noted above, there is
ample anecdotal and qualitative research to support the claim that
black youth are not only impulsive and immature like any other youth,
but they also have additional reasons to fear and avoid the police.317
Justice Sotomayor took pains to relegate the quantitative
developmental research to a footnote in J.D.B. to make the point that
we do not need science to tell us what every parent knows and what
every officer who has ever been a child knows.318 Likewise, it does not
stretch the officer’s imagination to contemplate any number of
reasons a black youth might run from the police.
Explicit consideration of the interplay between race and age in the
Fourth Amendment analysis is necessary to displace the fictitious
reasonable person in criminal law—a person who is white, male,
educated, and presumptively innocent.319 To that end, this Article has
surfaced the latent effects of race and adolescence on the definition of
seizure and urges police and courts to abandon long-held inferences
and judgments associated with behaviors like flight and hostility
among black youth. This Article also challenges the criminalization of
normal black adolescence and provides judges with an opportunity to
curtail implicitly and explicitly racially motivated searches and seizures.
Contrary to Justice Scalia’s assertion in Whren v. United States 320 that the
Fourth Amendment is not the appropriate constitutional basis for
objecting to “discriminatory application of laws,”321 this Article joins
scholars like Anthony Thompson who contend that it is too early to

315. See supra notes 103–14 and accompanying text.
316. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 275 (2011).
317. See supra notes 242–51 and accompanying text.
318. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272 n.6.
319. See supra notes 11–18 and accompanying text.
320. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
321. Id. at 813 (stating that the Equal Protection Clause is the appropriate basis to
address racial discrimination).
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take the Fourth Amendment off the table as a source of relief.322
2. Unwieldy task: subjective tests and changing cultural norms
Some critics will likely argue that incorporating seemingly subjective
factors like race and age into the Fourth Amendment analysis will
emphasize the variable and unreliable vulnerabilities of an individual
suspect and shift focus away from the reasonableness of police
conduct.323 Others may argue that it is too complicated and unwieldy to
allow officers to infer consciousness of guilt when white suspects flee,
but not black suspects, or to require officers to be more cautious when
approaching and seeking consent from a black suspect. Thus, as the
argument goes, Fourth Amendment standards such as seizure must
remain objective if they are to provide practical guidance for officers in
the field and deter the abuse of police power against minorities.324
Proponents of simplicity and objectivity contend that the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment are best served by providing law enforcement
officers with a clear, consistent, and predictable measure of when their
conduct or questioning will trigger constitutional protections.325
Objectivity ensures that Fourth Amendment protections do not “vary
with the state of mind of the particular individual being approached.”326
The Court in J.D.B. addressed similar concerns in deciding whether
age was a relevant and appropriate consideration in the Miranda
custody analysis.327 In that context, the Court explicitly rejected the
state’s arguments that allowing considerations of age to inform the
custody analysis would undercut the intended clarity of the Miranda
principle.328 To the contrary, Justice Sotomayor asserted that “ignoring
a juvenile defendant’s age will often make the [Miranda] inquiry more
artificial . . . and thus only add confusion.”329 The majority also
rejected any notion that Miranda works only with a “one-size-fits-all”
322. Thompson, supra note 95, at 961.
323. See Carter, supra note 17, at 1406–07.
324. Id. at 1391 (citing LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 9.4(a)).
325. Id.; Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988) (calling for a test that
provides consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless of
the particular individual’s response to the actions of the police and noting that “[t]he
test’s objective standard—looking to the reasonable man’s interpretation of the
conduct in question—allows the police to determine in advance whether the conduct
contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment”).
326. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574.
327. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 264 (2011).
328. Id. at 271–72.
329. Id. at 279.
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analysis and insisted that age is both a relevant and objective factor that
cannot be excluded from the Miranda analysis in the hope of making
it easier to implement.330
Some might argue that commonsense judgments should not be tied
to the ever-changing cultural dynamics between law enforcement and
society and should not require judges to speculate about evolving
perceptions and preferences among the police and civilians. This
argument ignores the fact that norms and commonsense judgments
do change, and that we do expect our courts to pay attention. The
juvenile death penalty was outlawed in 2005 precisely because public
opinion shifted.331 Juvenile life without parole was prohibited in nonhomicide cases precisely because we learned more about the resilience
of youth.332 By limiting the range of factors the police may consider in
the reasonable articulable suspicion analysis, this Article hopes to
reduce courts’ tremendous deference to police perception and to
encourage courts to engage in an a more rigorous and transparent
review of police conduct that considers both the impact of implicit
racial bias on the reliability of an officer’s factual observations and the
assignment of meaning to those facts.
Finally, nothing proposed in this Article is any more unwieldy for
judges than the current, highly ambiguous, reasonable articulable
suspicion standard. By its very nature, reasonable articulable suspicion
is a fluid, discretionary standard that requires officers to make
judgments based on experience and commonsense.333 This Article
simply attempts to bring the search and seizure doctrine, and its
attendant inferences and judgments, into line with contemporary
police-youth realities. As Justice Sotomayor noted in J.D.B.:
Just as police officers are competent to account for other objective
circumstances that are a matter of degree such as the length of
questioning or the number of officers present, so too are they
competent to evaluate the effect of relative age . . . . The same is true
of judges, including those whose childhoods have long since

330. Id.
331. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–79 (2005) (“[I]t is fair to say that the
United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile
death penalty.”).
332. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 78–79 (2010) (prohibiting life without
parole in part because of the long-term consequences of such incarceration on the
development of juveniles).
333. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (“Terms like ‘articulable
reasons’ and ‘founded suspicion’ are not self-defining . . . .”).
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passed . . . . In short, officers and judges need no imaginative powers,
knowledge of developmental psychology, training in cognitive
science, or expertise in social and cultural anthropology to account
for a child’s age. They simply need the common sense to know that a
[seven]-year-old is not a [thirteen]-year-old and neither is an adult.334

Ultimately, arguments about the need for predictability, fairness,
and ease of administration for the police are red herrings that draw
courts away from the reality that the dominant class in America has
managed to inscribe their own cultural views and interests into a
reasonableness standard.335 By not factoring race and age into the
search and seizure analysis, the current standard perpetuates
inequities in Fourth Amendment protections and leaves black youth
disproportionately vulnerable to police stops.
3. Consideration of race and age will render every encounter a seizure
At least one scholar has expressed concern that consideration of age
in the Fifth Amendment custody inquiry will make age the
determinative factor, rendering almost any police encounter with a
youth custodial.336 Others will likely raise similar objections in the
Fourth Amendment seizure context. Some judges and police officers
will worry that recognition of adolescents’ deference to adults and
racialized fears of the police will convert every police encounter with a
black youth into a seizure, discouraging officers from engaging with
black youth and leaving youth and the community in danger. As an
initial matter, this argument overstates the definitive influence of race
and age in the seizure analysis and ignores the vast array of other factors
that determine whether police conduct invokes Fourth Amendment
protections. An encounter in which weapons are drawn, physical force
is used, and a uniformed officer commands an individual to stop will
likely be recognized as a seizure regardless of the race or age of the
suspect. Other factors include the length of time involved in the
encounter, the officer’s tone of voice, and the officer’s exact words to
the suspect.337 Second, even if consideration of race and age does
increase the frequency with which courts will find a seizure, that
outcome would be appropriate to guard against the arbitrary searches
of black youth. The unique interplay between age and race argues in
334. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 279–80.
335. See Delgado, supra note 28, at 820–21.
336. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 17, at 1412–13 (rejecting the consideration of age
in the “free-to-leave” seizure test).
337. LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 9.4(a).
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favor of requiring police to justify their intrusion more often in
juvenile cases than adult cases and even more often when black youth
are involved than white youth. It does not mean that every seizure will
be illegal, but only that the police will have to justify those encounters
more often with the requisite quantum of suspicion.
4. Public safety and the totality of the circumstances
Some will complain that limiting the factors police may consider in
the reasonable articulable suspicion analysis will unnecessarily constrain
the officer’s expertise and intuition in detecting crime. The “totality of
the circumstances” test allows the police to consider a “series of acts,”
which by themselves may be innocent, but if taken together warrant
further investigation.338 Because officers have little time to reflect and
calculate before on-the-street encounters, they need flexibility to make
snap judgments to protect themselves and others.339 Consider Andre’s
encounter with the police. No doubt, many will be fixated on the fact
that Andre did indeed have a gun when he was frisked by police. Those
who favor the public safety advantage of getting that gun off the street
will likely oppose any interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that
undermines the officer’s legal authority to stop and investigate. These
critics would prefer to ignore race and adolescence if such
considerations would prevent officers from achieving their highest
priority—protecting the public. Unfortunately, this analysis ignores
important collateral implications of excessive stops of black youth and
assumes there is an absolute, positive correlation between getting one
gun off the street and subsequent short and long-term improvements in
public safety.340 These arguments fail to consider the psychological
impact of persistent police surveillance on black youth as a class.341
First, we must remember that although Andre had a gun, his friend
338. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
339. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (noting the
need for flexible investigation techniques and police questioning “as a tool in the
effective enforcement of criminal laws”); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110
(1977) (per curiam) (allowing officer flexibility to remove driver from car during a
stop because “the State’s proffered justification—the safety of the officer—is both
legitimate and weighty”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 10 (noting that law enforcement officers
on the street need “an escalating set of flexible responses”).
340. See infra note 345 and accompanying text.
341. Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban
Men, 104 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2321 (2014) (finding that young men stopped
by the police experienced compromised mental health, including higher levels of
anxiety and trauma).
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James did not. The vast majority of stops do not result in the recovery of
a gun, or any contraband at all.342 In New York, for example, out of over
500,000 police stops in 2009, officers found a gun in only 1.1 percent of
those encounters.343 Out of 4.4 million police stops in New York between
2009 and 2012, police ultimately released ninety percent of the targeted
persons after no evidence or other wrongdoing was discovered.344
Second, we must be careful not to dismiss James’s contact with the police
as an insignificant consequence of Andre’s arrest. The collateral damage
from over-policing black youth is significant not only for the many youth
who are stopped for no criminal activity at all, but also for the members
of the larger public who will be affected by the long-term, indirect impact
of over-policing on public safety. Adolescence is a critical time during
which norms and values, including beliefs about law and legal
institutions, are formed.345 Negative attitudes about the police acquired
during childhood and adolescence have a “lasting” effect on adults’
opinions about police.346 Thus, a child’s experiences and perceptions
of fairness and justice during adolescence may have a substantial
impact on their risk of offending and of having dangerous and hostile
encounters with the police as they transition to adulthood.347 Effective
socialization occurs when youth develop a healthy respect for legal
authority and internalize the social norms that prohibit illegal
behavior.348 Studies involving youth have found a strong correlation
between youths’ perceptions of legitimacy and self-reported compliance
with the law.349 Youth who perceive police to behave fairly are more like
to view police as legitimate authority figures, less likely to be cynical
about the law, and more likely to comply with the rules.350 In the long

342. Hutchins, supra note 156, at 903.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and Adolescents,
18 SOC. JUST. RES. 217, 220 (2005) [hereinafter Legal Socialization of Children].
346. Lyn Hinds, Building Police-Youth Relationships: The Importance of Procedural Justice,
7 YOUTH JUST. 195, 196 (2007); see Legal Socialization of Children, supra note 345, at 218–
19 (explaining that attitudes toward law and authority are developed early in life and
stick with people).
347. Hinds, supra note 346, at 196–97.
348. See Rick Trinkner & Ellen S. Cohn, Putting the “Social” Back in Legal Socialization:
Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Cynicism in Legal and Nonlegal Authorities, 38 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 602, 602 (2014).
349. Id. at 606–08; Erika K. Penner et al., Procedural Justice Versus Risk Factors for
Offending: Predicting Recidivism in Youth, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAVIOR 225, 225 (2014).
350. Penner et al., supra note 349, at 234; Trinkner & Cohn, supra note 348, at 608.
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run, fair and equitable policing enhances public safety while racially
disparate and arbitrary policing tends to erode public safety.
This Article does not ask courts to abandon the totality of the
circumstances test altogether, but instead to refine the boundaries of
that standard given what we now know about adolescent development,
implicit racial bias, and the realities of police-black relations. As
currently interpreted, the reasonable articulable suspicion standard is
so broad that it allows police to identify almost anything as evidence of
suspicion under the guise of the “totality.” Courts routinely defer to
police expertise and training and are reluctant to discredit officers’
justifications for suspicion.351 As long as an officer can articulate some
specific facts that justify the suspicion, they need not discuss or even
consider how race and age might have influenced their decision.352
When a black youth runs from the police, the officer need only talk
about the flight, not the race of the suspect. In this way, race is sanitized
from the analysis and judges pretend it is irrelevant. Although stops
based on race alone are not permitted,353 police may easily bury race
among a “post hoc litany” of other race-neutral reasons for their
suspicion.354 Because judges seldom question whether race had any
effect in the officers’ decision making process, it is generally impossible
to identify any particular instance of abuse in the search and seizure
inquiry. By not inquiring about race, courts absolve officers of
accountability for both conscious discriminatory intent and the
subconscious effects of implicit racial bias.
To correct this deficit in the totality analysis, it is essential that the range
of appropriately considered factors be narrowly tailored to help officers
distinguish between suspicious and innocent behaviors and that judges
and police officers be required to think critically about race in assigning
351. Thompson, supra note 95, at 970–71, 1001–02; see also United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981) (“[W]hen used by trained law enforcement officers, objective
facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be combined with permissible deductions . . .
to form a legitimate basis for suspicion.”).
352. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (noting that subjective
motivations lack Fourth Amendment significance if the officer can and does identify
objective bases for her actions).
353. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (condoning
stops that involve racial identification if it is not a primary factor in the stop); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 875, 886–87 (1975) (holding that stops made
by border police based on Mexican descent alone would not be enough, but noting
that Mexican appearance was relevant factor given the high likelihood that a person
of Mexican ancestry might be alien on the identified southern California highway).
354. Susskind, supra note 19, at 337.
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meaning to those behaviors. The need to clarify and restrain the
suspicion analysis has become even more important since the Court
diluted the probable cause standard to reasonable articulable suspicion
in Terry.355 Nonetheless, some will worry that if factors like nervousness
and flight are removed from the framework, then black youth will get a
“free pass” to walk about the streets carrying weapons and other
contraband with impunity. Detractors will also likely complain that police
should be increasing—not decreasing—the surveillance of youth given
evidence that delinquency peaks among adolescents between ages fifteen
and nineteen and given the general consensus that children need more
oversight for their own safety and healthy development.356 Yet, just as the
Fourth Amendment seeks to balance two competing interests—the
interests of citizens to be free from unreasonable liberty intrusions
(regulating police abuses) and the interests of police officers in protecting
themselves and other citizens and in enforcing the law357—the reasonable
articulable suspicion standard should protect both the right of black
youth to be left alone and the need for law enforcement to investigate
crime and ensure public safety. Taking factors like flight and nervousness
out of the suspicion rubric and requiring courts to reexamine the
assumptions that currently undergird all of the reasonable suspicion
factors serves both interests. The reality is that, although a majority of the
seventy-four million American youth self-report behaviors that could be
labeled delinquent,358 only a very small subset of those delinquent youth
come to the attention of authorities.359 Society has always tolerated some
355. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
356. Cross-cultural data indicate the onset of offending occurs between ages eight
and fourteen, the frequency of offending peaks between ages fifteen and nineteen,
and the peak of desistance occurs between ages twenty and twenty-nine. Kathryn C.
Monahan & Alex R. Piquero, Investigating the Longitudinal Relation Between Offending
Frequency and Offending Variety, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 653, 653–54 (2009).
357. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979) (examining the balance between
public interest in police protection and individual right to personal privacy); Terry, 392
U.S. at 9–12; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224–25 (1973)
(discussing competing concerns between law enforcement and individual rights,
stressing the value of consent searches to law enforcement while recognizing the
inherent risks of coercion).
358. United States, High School Youth Risk Behavior Survey, 2015, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://nccd.cdc.gov/Youthonline/App/Results.aspx?LID=XX
(last visited June 1, 2018) (reporting percentage of youth responses to a range of questions,
including unintentional injury or violence, tobacco use, and alcohol and drug use).
359. See SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE
JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2013, at 38 (2015), https://www.ojjdp.gov/
ojstatbb/njcda/pdf/jcs2013.pdf (noting that, in 2013, the number of delinquency
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level of undetected delinquency as a part of normal adolescence, and
there is little reason to believe that altering the suspicion framework will
increase the number of young black delinquents who pose a serious threat
to the safety and well-being of the community.360 Although black youth
are arrested at higher rates than white youth, self-report studies
consistently show that white youth engage in the same risky and
delinquent behavior as black youth.361 Further, the most dangerous
offenders are still likely to be detected by police relying on the remaining
factors in the reasonable articulable suspicion test—the report of a crime,
a suspect’s match with an adequately detailed description, a suspect’s
proximity to a precise crime location within a reasonably short time after
the report of crime, presence of an obvious weapon, verbal threats to
harm an officer (mitigated by adolescent development), physically
threatening gestures toward the police, and engagement in an obvious
criminal act, among others.362
5. Slippery Slope
Although this Article limits its discussion to black youth, the
arguments herein could easily apply to other racial and ethnic
minorities—most notably Latino Americans and Muslim Americans,
given the current political backlash against immigrants.363 No doubt,
cases sent to criminal court had dropped by fifty percent from the peak in 1994).
About 1.4 million cases were brought through juvenile courts in 2010. Id. at 6.
360. Most juvenile offenses involve non-violent offenses. See, e.g., MELISSA SICKMUND
& CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 2014 NATIONAL REPORT 71, 118 (2014) (reporting that theft, assault, drug
violations, and disorderly conduct accounted for more than half of juvenile arrests in
2010); see also Hutchins, supra note 156, at 912 (noting that most states allow civilians
to possess registered firearms and arguing that mere possession of a weapon does not
present the same threat as imminent robbery or other alleged offense in which a
weapon is believed to be in use).
361. Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color:
The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 408–15 (2013)
(discussing disproportionate arrests and self-report studies).
362. See Hutchins, supra note 156, at 884 & n.2 (listing cases in which courts have
looked to a vast range of other factors to establish reasonable suspicion).
363. See Brett Barrouquere, FBI: Hate Crimes Reach 5-Year High in 2016, Jumped as
Trump Rolled Toward Presidency, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR. (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/11/13/fbi-hate-crimes-reach-5-yearhigh-2016-jumped-trump-rolled-toward-presidency-0 (highlighting that hate crimes
hit a five-year high following the 2016 presidential election); see also, e.g., Brian Levin,
Explaining the Rise of Hate Crimes Against Muslims in the United States, CONVERSATION (July
19, 2017, 9:50 PM), http://theconversation.com/explaining-the-rise-in-hate-crimesagainst-muslims-in-the-us-80304 (explaining trends and causes in hate crimes against
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some will object to any modification of the reasonable articulable
suspicion framework that opens the door to a “slippery slope”
argument364—that is, if we adopt a reasonable black child standard,
then there is no limit to the number of “special” standards we must
create to account for the unique experiences of other demographic
groups. Must there be a reasonable Asian child standard? A
reasonable Asian adult standard? Should the standard be different for
black males and black women? Should the standard be different for
black children and black adults?
Ultimately, as Professor Nourse argues, “The subjective/objective
debate tends to keep us arguing about whether we are creating ‘special’
new rules for favored and disfavored classes when the real hard work is
in the law’s history, application, and meaning.”365 Our challenge as a
society is to adopt a standard that does not penalize disadvantaged
groups simply for being disadvantaged.366 A “reasonable black child”
lens is necessary only because the current reasonable person doctrine is
culturally normed to penalize black youth and favor white adults in
traditional legal analysis.367
B. Police Training and Reform
This Article has focused most of its attention on the role of courts in
setting standards and evaluating the legality of police conduct on review.
But reform must start much earlier. Black youth make up a unique
demographic, with whom police departments should be intentional in
fostering positive and equitable interactions. Long-term change will
require department-wide cultural shifts that can only be achieved
through training, sustained professional development, police
accountability, and positive community engagement with black youth.368
Muslims); Jessica Weiss, Six Months of Hate: How Anti-Immigrant Sentiment Is Affecting
Latinos in the United States, UNIVISION (June 14, 2017, 3:27 PM),
https://www.univision.com/univision-news/united-states/six-months-of-hate-howanti-immigrant-sentiment-is-affecting-latinos-in-the-united-states (reporting personal
accounts of Hispanic individuals who were targets of verbal and physical race-related
harassment).
364. See Carter, supra note 17, at 1420–21 (positing that allowing courts to consider age
when determining if a reasonable person would feel free to disengage would create a slippery
slope where courts consider other individual characteristics, such as race and gender).
365. Nourse, supra note 120, at 50.
366. Id. at 48.
367. Cf. id. at 49 (recognizing the need for a reasonable woman standard that does
not penalize women for being women).
368. See, e.g., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra
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From the outset, entry-level cadet training should help police
understand the fundamental features of adolescence and the role of
implicit racial bias in decision making. Training exercises should help
police officers develop special skills in working with youth and
encourage them to relinquish entrenched stereotypes and assumptions
about the behavior of black children. Fortunately, research suggests that
well-intentioned actors can overcome automatic or implicit biases, at
least to some extent, when they are made aware of the stereotypes and
biases they hold, have the cognitive capacity to self-correct, and are
motivated to do so.369 Similarly, studies have found that officers who
participate in training to enhance their knowledge of normal
adolescent behavior hold more favorable attitudes toward youth after
the training.370 A few innovative programs have been launched across
the country to improve youth-police relations.371 In Philadelphia, for
example, new and experienced law enforcement officers have
participated in workshops to help them understand youth culture,
adolescent development, and youth coping skills and to teach them to
distinguish between normal adolescent behavior and criminal
conduct.372 In separate sessions, youth learned how their own demeanor
and behavior impacts their interactions with the police and discussed
strategies for creating positive and safe encounters with law

note 279, at 3–5 (analyzing the “systemic deficiencies in [the Baltimore Police
Department’s] policies, training, supervision, and accountability structures[,]” noting
that “there is widespread agreement that [the Department] needs reform[,]” and
“encourag[ing] [the Department] to be proactive, to get to know Baltimore’s
communities more deeply, build trust, and reduce crime together with the
communities it serves”).
369. John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial Decision-Making:
The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2010) (summarizing research on
strategies to reduce implicit judicial bias); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 1489, 1529–30, 1529 n.207 (2005); Rachlinski et al., supra note 197, at 1196–
97, 1221 (indicating that judges are able to control implicit biases when they are aware
of them and motivated to do so).
370. See Valerie LaMotte et al., Effective Police Interactions with Youth: A Program
Evaluation, 13 POLICE Q., 161, 174 (2010) (highlighting the benefits of adolescent
behavior training for police officers).
371. MACARTHUR FOUND. & INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT’S
LEADERSHIP ROLE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM: ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PRACTICE AND POLICY 18–19, 21 (2014) [hereinafter LAW ENFORCEMENT’S LEADERSHIP],
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/documents/pdfs/JuvenileJusticeSummitReport.p
df (discussing the development of programs designed to reduce the disproportionate
arrest rate of youths of color).
372. Id.
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enforcement.373 In joint sessions, police and youth engaged in honest
and open dialogue about tensions in the community.374 To promote
training and youth-police dialogue on a national scale, youth advocate
Lisa Thurau founded Strategies for Youth (“SFY”) to develop a
national curriculum for training police on how to work effectively with
young people.375 Recognizing that youth respond differently to social
cues and that a child’s developmental stage affects how he or she will
perceive, process, and respond to the police, SFY teaches officers to
engage youth with empathy, patience, and techniques designed to deescalate adolescent outbursts.376
Beyond training, appropriate youth-police relationships require
organizational commitment from the top down. Police chiefs must
articulate and demonstrate a public commitment to both racial equity
and policing strategies that promote healthy and appropriate
interactions with youth. Law enforcement agencies may develop and
enforce internal departmental regulations that specifically guide officers
in their interactions with adolescents, prevent racial profiling, and
require officers to treat blacks with dignity and respect. Officers who
violate these regulations should be held accountable. Supervisors may
monitor officers’ behavior by routinely reviewing body-worn cameras
and completing performance reviews that evaluate the officers’
interactions with youth and racial minorities. Police departments may
also engage youth informally through youth-police sports leagues,
community service activities, team-building or leadership-development
courses, and other less structured activities at a local recreation facility.377
Police departments should also significantly reduce their footprint on, if
not withdraw entirely from, public school governance and return primary
responsibility for school discipline to teachers, parents, and school
counselors. Police officers should collaborate with school officials to
decrease the scope of disciplinary issues SROs may address. Memoranda of
understanding and school offense protocols for SROs may preclude arrests

373. Id.
374. Id.
375. See About, STRATEGIES FOR YOUTH, http://strategiesforyouth.org/about (last
visited June 1, 2018). SFY offers courses such as Policing the Teen Brain, Policing the
Teen Brain in School, Policing Youth on Public Transit, and Policing Youth
Chronically Exposed to Trauma and Violence. Courses, STRATEGIES FOR YOUTH,
http://strategiesforyouth.org/for-police/training/courses (last visited June 1, 2018).
376. See Philosophy, STRATEGIES FOR YOUTH, http://strategiesforyouth.org/
about/philosophy (last visited June 1, 2018).
377. LAW ENFORCEMENT’S LEADERSHIP, supra note 371, at 19.
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for typical adolescent behavior, such as marijuana possession, disorderly
conduct, adolescent aggressive speech that sounds like a threat, and even
non-serious assaults common in school fights.378 To compensate for the
reduced police presence, schools might hire school administrators,
counselors, social workers, and mental health professionals who are
particularly trained to identify and assist troubled youth.379
Federal agencies should also realign funding priorities to reduce
support for school resource officers and other militaristic crime
control measures like metal detectors and instead reallocate funding
to innovative policing programs that embrace age-appropriate
policing. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
in partnership with the International Association of Chiefs of Police,
recently acknowledged the importance of successful youth policing in
its brief, The Effects of Adolescent Development on Policing.380 The brief not
only recognizes the importance of educating the police on adolescent
brain development and its effect on law enforcement interactions with
youth, but it also offers specific policing tips and highlights innovative
programs and best practices.381
Finally, state and federal legislation may regulate police conduct by
banning racial profiling by the police, mandating on-going training,382
and insisting upon equal and uniform enforcement of the law.383 In a
recent fifty-state survey, the NAACP found only thirty states with any antiracial profiling legislation at all, and found no state with all of the
necessary components of an effective policy.384 New and existing statutes
378. For example, in Philadelphia, in 2014, the police chief instructed his officers
to stop arresting youth for minor infractions, such as schoolyard fights and possession
of small amounts of marijuana, which together accounted for about sixty percent of
all school-based arrests. Police in Schools, supra note 106. Similarly, Denver Public
Schools entered into an agreement with the Denver Police Department to prevent
officers from writing tickets for minor misbehavior, such as ban language. Sadie
Gurman, Agreement Keeps Denver Police Out of Most School Discipline Problems, DENVER POST
(Feb. 19, 2013, 7:39 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2013/02/19/agreementkeeps-denver-police-out-of-most-school-discipline-problems.
379. Jackson, supra note 104, at 631.
380. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE EFFECTS OF ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT ON
POLICING 1, 4 (2014), http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/
IACPBriefEffectsofAdolescentDevelopmentonPolicing.pdf.
381. Id.
382. See, e.g., 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/7 (2018) (equal and uniform enforcement of
the law in traffic cases); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-212 (2018) (requiring data
collection in traffic stops).
383. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2605/2605-85 (2018) (training).
384. NAACP, BORN SUSPECT: STOP-AND-FRISK ABUSES AND THE CONTINUED FIGHT TO
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should be enhanced to ban the stop of pedestrians and motorists for
minor violations such as jay walking or failure to wear a seatbelt as a
pretext for the search for illegal contraband.385 Effective anti-racial
profiling laws should also mandate data collection for all stops and
searches, require analysis and publication of racial profiling data, create
special commissions to review and respond to complaints of racial
profiling, and provide state funds for mandatory training.386 Effective
policies will also specify penalties for officers who engage in racial
profiling and allow aggrieved individuals to seek relief in state courts.387
CONCLUSION
“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear
and unquestionable authority of law.”388 This Article contends that the
current interpretation of the search and seizure doctrine does not
adequately protect the Fourth Amendment rights of black youth.
Examining four aspects of the Fourth Amendment framework, this
Article urges police and courts to consider the unique interplay
between race and adolescence in evaluating the onset of a seizure,
voluntariness in the consent to search doctrine, the reliability of an
officer’s observed facts in the reasonable articulable suspicion rubric,
and the court’s assignment of meaning to those facts.
This Article argues that our current reliance on a reasonable person
standard in the seizure analysis fails to account for what we know about
adolescent development and the ever-growing tensions between black
youth and law enforcement. Further, although the voluntariness test
in the consent-to-search doctrine allows courts more flexibility to
consider the unique vulnerabilities of individuals who consent,
reviewing courts rarely, if ever, consider the intersecting effects of race
and age on a child’s capacity to freely and voluntarily consent.
Similarly, police and courts rarely acknowledge the impact of implicit
racial bias on the accuracy of an officer’s objective factual observations

END RACIAL PROFILING IN AMERICA 26 (2014), https://action.naacp.org/page//Criminal%20Justice/Born_Suspect_Report_final_web.pdf.
385. Id. at 19.
386. See id. app. 2 (describing the components of an effective racial profiling law).
387. Id. at 19 (noting that even Connecticut, which has one of the most
comprehensive anti-profiling statute, fails to provide a specific right of action).
388. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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in the reasonable articulable suspicion standard. Even when the
officer’s factual observations are not distorted by race, current
judgments about the meaning of behaviors like nervousness and flight
from police are outdated and ignore the realities of normal adolescent
behavior and police-on-black violence that provide black youth with
many reasons to flee.
To ensure adequate Fourth Amendment protection for black youth,
police and courts must be honest and thoughtful about how race and
age affect every critical decision in the Fourth Amendment framework.
To this end, it is incumbent upon police officers to better understand
the key features of normal adolescent development and the cognitive
science of implicit racial bias. It is equally incumbent upon reviewing
courts to hold the police accountable for conscious and subconscious
biases by inquiring specifically about the role of race and adolescence
at each stage of the Fourth Amendment analysis.

